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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines a struggle for Environmental Justice over the long
term to understand the impacts of current state-led strategies for achieving
Environmental Justice. Recent geographic scholarship in Environmental Justice
literatures suggests that state-centric strategies come with problems scholars have yet
to fully comprehend. This dissertation, based on fieldwork and archival research in
Anniston, Alabama, supports this claim with three main findings: 1) Corporations
produce scaled identities to advantageously empower themselves and weather shifts in
their profitability, while ordinary people are limited in their capacity to respond in kind
to such unequal power arrangements. 2) Current legal solutions for Environmental
Justice are not meeting the demands expressed by Environmental Justice movement
actors, and in themselves demonstrate a resistance to solutions that would more fairly
address a collective body of victims due to the normative economizing of
neoliberalism. 3) The process of remediation is confined to limiting risks from the
physical environment, even while the city itself continues to struggle. This can cause a
source of pain and frustration for residents who remain in impacted areas, who wish to
see a more holistic solution to resolving environmental injustice, including remediating
a sense of place.
v

PREFACE

Readers may find it helpful to refer to maps of Anniston while reading this dissertation.
Online maps are available at www.ReconstructAnniston.net as part of a planned
expansion of this research. Refer any questions about the website to the author’s
permanent email address: melbtennessee@gmail.com.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1

The intersections of race, class, and environmental harm have motivated
decades of research and activism in the Environmental Justice movement.
Environmental Justice describes a social movement and interdisciplinary research
agenda to change the destructive patterns of industrial activities (Holifield 2012)
among other environmental problems. Despite the institutionalization of Environmental
Justice language in state policy, the path to justice in the wake of environmental
inequalities remains uncertain (Pulido et al 2016, Pellow and Brulle 2005). What does it
mean to achieve Environmental Justice? Who decides? Recently, scholars observed
through retrospective inquiry that most Environmental Justice movements have relied
heavily on direct engagement with the state to achieve justice, but the limits to such an
engagement are becoming clearer (Pulido et al 2016). State institutions have not yet
proven able to sufficiently provide justice for communities harmed by pollution and
environmental neglect. This dissertation expands on this notion through analysis of the
implementation of the state’s praxis for Environmental Justice through a case study in
Anniston, Alabama. Since the mid-1990s, Anniston residents, legal professionals,
corporate actors, and state environmental officials have participated in the cleanup of
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Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) dumped by The Monsanto Company1. Stretching
over several decades, involving one of the world’s most notorious multinational
corporations, and home to one of the largest toxic tort settlements in US history, the
Anniston case is a rich, well-documented microcosm of the challenges many
communities must face to compel neoliberal US state institutions to meet the demands
of the Environmental Justice movement.
This case study lies at the confluence of Environmental Justice, political
economy, legal geography, and public memory, and examines the tensions between
everyday people, the state, and corporations in the struggle for Environmental Justice
in Anniston. The design and implementation of environmental laws, legal decisions,
and regulations largely excludes public involvement, relegating such decision-making
to scientific and legal experts (Kohl 2015). As a result, the ideals expressed by
Environmental Justice movement actors and ordinary residents are distant from the
day-to-day design and implementation of Environmental Justice policy. This has an

At times, I refer to The Monsanto Company, rather than its more well-known name, Monsanto. This is
to signify a different time period for the company. When it was actively polluting Anniston, it was called
The Monsanto Company. Changes to its name were part of broader structural changes to the company,
which are discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
1

2

enormous impact on the way places recover from environmental injustice over the long
term.
This research is guided by observational and archival methodologies. From
2013-2016, I attended semi-monthly Community Advisory Group (CAG) meetings held
by Anniston residents. These meetings, a relatively common piece of long-term EPA
cleanups, are held to inform impacted communities about the state of the pollution in
the area and the progress to clean it up. Over the course of my time in Anniston,
themes continued to emerge (and erupt) from these meetings around the dialectical
tensions of power/disempowerment and recognition/erasure. The case of Anniston
exemplifies the notion that everything contains its opposite (Ollman 2003). These
emergent themes drive the research questions in this dissertation, which seeks to shed
light on the historical and spatial underpinnings of the tensions that animate Anniston’s
story. This research is guided by the following questions:

1) What relationships do corporate actors produce across scales to mitigate the
consequences of environmental injustice?
Corporate entities are key players in many Environmental Justice conflicts as the
instigators of environmental problems and as major players in processes to clean up
pollution. However, corporations’ relationships to cleanup processes are complex in
3

contemporary neoliberal environmental governance. Corporations may be
environmental policymakers (Pellow 2001), environmental stewards (Berry and
Rondinelli 1998), and environmental violators (Brammer and Pavelin 2005) depending
on the time and circumstances. Corporations shift the ways in which they identify with
environmental issues depending on situational, temporal, and spatial circumstances,
strategically transforming their relationships with actors across different scales.
Corporations’ relationships to the environment both shape and are shaped by the
notion of scale.
In chapter three, “Corporate Transformations and the erasure of Environmental
Injustice in Anniston, Alabama,” the author uses archival data to reconstruct how The
Monsanto Company shifted its relationships with environmental issues over time in
response to multiple pressure points across scales. A dialectical analysis of these shifts
demonstrates that multi-scalar pushes toward enforcing greater environmental
stewardship in corporate culture had the inverse effect of empowering corporate
actors’ ability to control the debates about pollution in Anniston. The
institutionalization of corporate environmental sensibilities created a new avenue to
take power in environmental decision-making and messaging. Monsanto’s strategic
shift toward environmental stewardship produced new relationships across scales to
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downplay the impacts and scope of the pollution, ensure the survival of the company,
and ensure influence in the cleanup process itself.

2) How did legal and scientific experts guide the construction and implementation of
the cleanup plan? How is environmental governance shaped by the political economy
of the US?
Legal and scientific authorities rely heavily on scientific “objectivity” and
“expertise” to create authoritative remedial plans and guidelines. These plans calculate
acceptable levels of risk for residents living in the midst of polluted environments, and
determine the process through which acceptable levels of pollution are achieved.
However, as Giddens, Beck, and many others who use the framework of the “Risk
Society” argue (Beck 1992; Beck 2013; Cable, Shriver, and Mix 2008; Ekberg 2007;
Giddens 1999; Giddens 2013), the notion of risk is more than a scientific calculation.
Risk is also socially constructed and shaped by political-economic context. In Anniston,
acceptable risks were calculated to manage the limitations of the political and
economic moment during which the crisis unfolded.
Chapter four, “Anniston’s Neoliberal Environmental Policy in Practice,” a critical
reading of Anniston’s settlement documentation, analyzes the way scientific and legal
authority is used to manage pollutant risks in Anniston. This chapter uses three
5

moments to to demonstrate this point: the rationale and decision-making behind the
decision to settle lawsuits in 2003, the decision to designate Anniston as a Superfund
“Alternative” Site, and the distribution of the settlement funds.

3) What role does memory play in the articulation of ongoing environmental injustices?
Remedial plans focus on the physical erasure of pollution – clean soil, water, and
air – but in the process of the cleanup in Anniston, the remediation has also
contributed to the erasure of a sense of place. Lots lay vacant, many homes are
dilapidated, many businesses in the most heavily impacted areas have struggled or
failed, schools are being shut down, and the population is dwindling. Among people
still living in the area who are still involved in the remediation process, this
transformation raises questions about what the remedial plan was designed to
accomplish.
Chapter 5, “Remediating a Sense of Place,” analyzes the impacts of PCB
pollution and remediation on the qualitative notions of “place” in Anniston. While
remediation may have positive intentions, it neglects the qualities of life that people in
West Anniston valued most: a sense of community, and a positive sense of place. This
analysis draws questions about the way systems of environmental governance
(re)produce racialized inequalities expressed in space and place. In addition, due to the
6

impact that this pollution has and continues to have on black lives and livelihoods in
the city, this speaks to broader issues about the (de)valuation of black life in US society.
What appears to be a benign extension of environmentalist goodwill unto West
Anniston instead functions as another violent encounter from the state; remediation
becomes a tool to facilitate the violence of forgetting.

Geographic Context
Nestled in the foothills of the Appalachian Mountains, Anniston’s tree-lined main
thoroughfare, Quintard Avenue, showcases a quaint downtown complete with stately
stone churches, elegant old homes, and several local businesses and restaurants. West
of Quintard Avenue is Noble Street, the downtown area that city officials seek to
revitalize after several decades of depression. Recent additions to the district include
several new restaurants, boutiques, and a micro-brewery. The city is reminiscent of
many small southern industrial towns, where officials attempt to reinvent a cultural life
in the wake of neoliberal reorganization and industrial divestment.
The West Anniston neighborhood, a wide-reaching area that begins west of
Noble Street, seems exempt from this attention. West Anniston stands in stark contrast
to the quaint charms of the east side. Elegant old homes are crumbling, some with
residents inside, others abandoned to the elements and a thriving kingdom of kudzu.
7

Many lots sit curiously vacant, leaving gaps that disrupt the flow of the streets, drawing
questions about what is missing. Why does this land sit in such contrast—yet in such
close proximity—to parts of the city that are actively redeveloping?
Carver Community Center breathes some life into this landscape. It holds a
branch of the community library, recreational facilities, and is a common meeting place
for organizations in the neighborhood. It has been the longtime public meeting
location of the Community Advisory Group for the Consent Decree (CAG), a group that
organizes informational sessions about the progress of the PCB cleanup in the area.
The pollution’s severity earned Anniston the unfortunate nickname, “Toxic City,” after
Monsanto was held liable for the negligent disposal of PCBs in the city’s soil, water,
and air. The meeting is located in West Anniston because it is the neighborhood that
was most directly affected by the pollution, and has been the home of a significant
amount of cleanup activities.

Historical Context
From the 1930s to the 1990s, The Monsanto Company operated an industrial
chemical company in Anniston. During that time, it manufactured PCBs, a key
component of its best-selling product, Aroclors, used as insulation for heavy equipment
(Spears 2014). This product, engineered by industrial chemists working for Monsanto,
8

was one of the most profitable products in the entire company, and Anniston was one
of only two places in the United States that manufactured it2. As part of the
manufacturing process, PCBs were routinely dumped into a landfill or directly into the
nearest river, and today, the town’s soil, water, and air remain contaminated some 37
years after the chemical was banned in 1979 due to global concerns about its toxicity
for humans and the environment.
Anniston is the PCB contamination "capital" of the United States. Residents are
routinely cited in EPA documentation with the highest blood levels of PCBs of any
known population (Health Consultation, 1999). PCBs are widely known to cause health
problems, and are included on the EPA's "probable carcinogens" list (Cogliano 1996).
The dangers of PCBs have been documented almost since the very start of their
manufacture, when workers reported developing a skin condition called chlorachne,
wherein large, painful open sores would emerge and linger after direct contact with the
substance. Workers complained of headaches, nosebleeds, and would frequently come
down with strange cancers and illnesses of the liver and major organs. Before long,
residents were complaining of the same kinds of conditions, and local informal records

The other town was Monsanto, Illinois. It has since been renamed Sauget, Illinois. It is
part of the St. Louis metropolitan area.
9
2

kept by residents indicate that people living near the factory, in the predominantly
black West Anniston neighborhood, frequently died from strange diseases that no one
could medically explain (Spears 2014). Horrific stories abound in the archives, like this
one, where a reporter recounted the story of a young boy: “[His sister described] How
Manuel "blanked out" and went into seizures at age 9. How doctors took a spinal tap
and reported "unknown toxins" in his body. How by his late 30s, he was so weak he
could not lift his hand to feed himself. How Manuel, completely blind, was overcome
by psychosis and saw monsters coming for him at the end. He died of heart failure last
year at a nursing home, at the age of 40” (Barry 2004).
It was not until Monsanto began quietly buying up properties in Anniston in the
1990s that the pollution became more widely known to the general public. These
buyouts resulted in massive changes in the landscape that made the issue increasingly
difficult to ignore, particularly among West Anniston residents, who were
propositioned to make choices about selling their homes or continuing to reside on
polluted land. While Monsanto intended to avoid a conflict by acting “proactively,” the
company actually stirred residents’ long-held fears about the impacts of the factory.
As a result, local residents organized a social movement to investigate the
pollution and advocate for those who were becoming entangled in this conflict.
Community leaders and residents from areas most affected by the pollution—
10

particularly in the West Anniston neighborhood—formed a group called Community
Against Pollution (CAP) to organize against Monsanto's negligence and fight for their
community, which was being rapidly depleted by the property buyouts (Spears 2014).
A once vibrant black community was decimated, as Monsanto tore down structures on
its buyout properties, leaving them vacant, and devaluing those that remained.
In many ways, the movement spearheaded by CAP was terrifically effective. It
was eventually revealed, through persistent investigation and advocacy, that Monsanto
had scientific evidence about the toxicity and dangers of PCB pollution as early as the
1960s (Spears 2014). In addition, through a series of permit applications for landfill
sites, it was also evident that the State of Alabama was aware of the presence of
hazardous material, but did little to inform the broader community about potential
dangers (“ADEM Hazardous Waste Facility Permit No. 004-019-048” 1986). The
discovery of this information enraged local residents, and inspired mass numbers of
people to pursue multiple lawsuits against Monsanto and the company to which it
strategically divested its chemical holdings in the late 1990s, Solutia.
These lawsuits attracted national attention in the news media (“Monsanto Hid
Decades Of Pollution” 2015; “Toxic Secret” 2013), and they attracted internationally
renowned supporters, notably Johnny Cochran, a lawyer famous for his defense of O.J.
Simpson, and who attracted 5,000 potential clients when he came to meet with people
11

in Anniston in 2001 (Spears 2014, 262-3). His suit would grow to attract nearly 20,000
plaintiffs. In addition, the trials allowed the movement to partially achieve its goals of
winning compensation for Anniston residents. One of the trials, Sabrina Abernathy v.
Monsanto, was successful in earning a ruling that Monsanto was responsible for
negligent pollution, forcing the company to award damages totaling $40 million. This
put substantial pressure on Monsanto, Solutia, and the courts to bring all of the cases
to a simultaneous conclusion in 2003 with a global settlement totaling $700 million
(Spears 2014, 263).
During the settlement negotiations, a consent decree document governing the
cleanup process ordered: 1) a lump sum of money to be divided amongst the plaintiffs
according to various degrees of damages; 2) an environmental remediation plan to be
funded by Solutia and co-executed and managed by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA); 3) the formation of the Community Advisory Group for the Consent
Decree (CAG), which was tasked to oversee the cleanup process and represent the
community’s interests; 4) a health clinic funded by Solutia; 5) at least two nonprofit
entities to support the West Anniston community: The Anniston Community Education
Foundation and the West Anniston Foundation. These various groups are key
stakeholders throughout this cleanup process.

12

Dissertation Context
The questions guiding this dissertation pick up Anniston’s story at a time when
the public drama surrounding the PCB crisis was largely over. When I began visiting
Anniston in 2013, the settlements were distributed, the cleanup was designed, and the
system was simply executing the plans that various stakeholders had created. However,
there is a quiet danger in that banality that is important for scholars and Environmental
Justice activists to understand. Long after the excitement of these cases dwindles
down, there are many more decisions to be made, a hundred more meetings to
attend, tens of thousands of pages to be read – settlements and consent decrees are
hardly resolutions at all. It is the beginning of a next step in environmental governance
where experts take the helm, where law executes its authority (for better and for
worse), and where cities are reshaped from pollution minefields into whatever it is they
will ultimately turn out to be. At this point, there is little more that ordinary people can
do within the confines of our current system to change the outcome, even if the
outcome is as dismal as West Anniston’s appears to be. However, the current state of
affairs should not be a death-knell for the future. This study, and others in this vein, can
do the work of documenting these shortcomings in order to innovate more justiceoriented strategies.

13

My approach to this field seeks to clarify the path to Environmental Justice by
taking seriously the contributions of critical human geography’s understandings of the
production of space and uneven development. In political economy, I draw on the
work of Neil Smith and Erik Swyngedoew, who seek to understand the reorganization
of spatial relationships in the wake of neoliberal globalization. Their analyses, which
broadly argue that uneven development is a necessary component to capitalism as it
continuously seeks out the most profitable places for development, dovetails well with
the patterns that scholars observe in Environmental Justice literatures. Often, the
places that are most vulnerable to environmental malfeasance are also the places that
have low costs of doing business- lax environmental regulations, low restrictions on
labor, and so forth. This is why there is a broad global trend of primary industries –
such as mining – taking place in the global south, and increasingly, in the US south,
where states are in a race to the bottom for attracting re-investment from mining,
manufacturing and other heavy industries. In addition, scholars like Ruth Wilson
Gilmore, Katherine McKittrick, and Josh Inwood, connect this uneven development to
broader processes of racialization that dialectically shape the production of landscape.
They bring into sharp focus that development is not just about economics but it also
about ethics: who is included, how people are heard, and how that is expressed both
in our legal systems and through the landscapes that we create. Policymakers have to
14

think beyond paradigms of Environmental Justice that only quantify injury, to those
that assign differential values to bodies, and that reproduce the patterns of uneven
development that continue to injure nonwhite communities in the United States and
beyond.
This dissertation, as critical as it may be of the impacts of certain strategies of
Environmental Justice, is shaped by a deep appreciation for struggle; even when
people face incredible odds against success, and may be devalued by systems of
governance, they fight. And sometimes, they win. Appreciating the people’s struggle
for Environmental Justice, as scholars like Laura Pulido and Rob Nixon do, can help
society create a primer for building a better world. This work joins Pulido and Nixon in
calling for a stronger critique of the progress and challenges facing the project of
Environmental Justice. It is through bearing witness to the acts of courageous people
that courage may become contagio

15

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
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Introduction
Struggles for Environmental Justice frequently include a direct engagement with
the legal system; legal systems often significantly shape the possibilities for how
Environmental Justice is conceived. However, the multiple scales of power embedded
in legal actions, proceedings, and arguments raise questions about inclusion/exclusion;
Are the scales of justice truly balanced in a system where corporations have the rights
of "personhood" (Barkan 2011; Barkan 2015; Pollman 2011)? What are the legalpolitical implications of scalar transformations such as globalization, as corporate
persons have obligations, interests, and networks that transcend the local (Fraser
2010)? What does this mean for local actors who lack access to such arrangements, and
how is power gained (Swyngedouw 2004)? This research takes place in a context where
the legal system's prescriptions for justice do not align with conceptions of justice
victims advocate, suggesting a spatial mismatch to be explored.
Modern geographic scholarship teaches how humans are all linked, albeit
unevenly, by the current economic epoch of global neoliberal capitalism. Humanity’s
problems, human lives, and the ultimate outcomes of human existence are all
intertwined as capital leaves, arrives anew, exploits, connects, separates. Everyone
plays a role in capital's search for its "fix," a term in Harvey's (2001) geographic
analyses of globalization. The nature of capitalism's changes depends on what is
17

needed to achieve capital's fix—"fix" meaning both its immediate survival needs, but
also its ability to continue to exist, be fixed, in a particular place. In this analysis,
Capitalism’s current incarnation has three important characteristics: 1) it is necessarily
expansionary for its survival due to crises of over-accumulation; 2) it requires
innovations in technology and communication to facilitate this expansion; 3) it changes
based on its mode of expansion, whether seeking new sources of resources, labor,
and/or markets.
The law is ever-present in the circulation of capital and resources, and is
produced alongside capital's fixity in place as well as its journey to find its fix across
space. It creates and destroys paths for capital accumulation and mobility, a process
that has been well-documented on the macro-scale as new supra-state structures have
been created to facilitate capital expansion and mobility (Gowan 1999; Robinson
2001). In addition, there is work about the local impacts of globalization, that shows
capital transformations are not limited to a macro-scalar event (Herod 2001; Grant and
Nijman 2002). This research explores a messy middle area somewhere between the
local and the global where the law plays a particularly important role. In legal disputes,
actors at multiple scales of power converge and are forced to reckon with each other,
and the impacts of that reckoning create new structures that have material
consequences. Thus, this work is structured as an answer to Barkan’s (2009) call for
18

geographic scholarship that engages with the law empirically and theoretically to “help
us conceptualize more rigorously the processes by which political and economic space
is formulated, contested, reproduced, and transformed” (2009: 602) in a global society.
Similarly, Pulido’s (2000) call asks scholars to take seriously the relationship
between environmental injustices and the structures that produce racialized, classed,
and white supremacist spaces. Because pollution and environmental hazards
disproportionately impact communities of color, the structures in place that shape
those outcomes should be challenged. Social science literature is full of examples of
how our current systems of governance—economic, social, and legal—
disproportionately underserve and/or exploit poor, nonwhite populations. However,
there is less known about the opposite side of that coin: how do our current systems of
governance favor the white, wealthy, and powerful? Just as systems are created to
serve the exploitative needs of capital, they are created to benefit those with
significant economic and social privilege. Thus, I argue, if the point of our scholarly
existence is to help create positive, just changes in the world- if, as Marx wrote, “the
point is to change it” (Marx 1888)- then decisions to engage with the formal legal
system in its current moment must be critically scrutinized as an avenue through which
scholars, advocates, and activists might engage.

19

This review weaves together relatively disparate conversations about the
environment and justice in three sub-fields: political economy, legal geography, and
landscape/memory studies. Furthermore, it explores the intersections of Environmental
Justice with these fields, and identifies the key areas in the field to which this
dissertation is poised to make a contribution: first, strengthening the connection
between Environmental Justice and the critical use of scale in geography. Second,
deepening a critique of neoliberalism’s impact on the current legal systems for
Environmental Justice. Third, strengthening connections between Environmental
Justice and memory studies.

Risk, Scale, and Tensions with Justice
Ulrich Beck’s now-classic text, Risk Society, identifies a paradigm that emerged
hand-in-hand with modern industrialization (1992). He argues that class society, or the
“dictatorship of scarcity,” has dominated the source of conflict and social stratification
throughout modernization. However, in some parts of the world, “the struggle for
one’s ‘daily bread’ has lost its urgency as a cardinal problem overshadowing everything
else,” and collective risks created by modernization have emerged as the basis of a
new social system.

20

The geographic arrangements, and the different scales at which risks are
experienced, determined, and mediated raises questions about how the risk society
produces scalar configurations of political and economic power. Expanding on the
work of geographers like Erik Swyngedouw (Swyngedouw 2004), Neil Smith (Smith
2010), and others writing about environmental political economy (Beck 1993, Foster
2011), I expand analyses of the risk society by analyzing the role of scale in cases of
environmental inequality such as Anniston's. This kind of understanding is important
because, according to Swyngedouw (2004), the production of scale is intimately tied to
"struggles for control and empowerment" (33). An understanding of how scale is
produced and by whom it is harnessed is important for innovating solutions in
Environmental Justice cases.
As scholars work toward comprehensive solutions to environmental inequalities, it
is imperative that we understand notions of justice across scales in order to understand
the local context of environmental inequalities in relation to the global activities of
corporate actors and institutions. Otherwise, we risk allowing a cycle of impunity to
persist, wherein corporations are able to settle conflicts in one geographic area,
satisfying localized prescriptions for justice, while continuing to inflict environmental
injustices in other places. Moving forward, I discuss how these concerns about scale
intersect with Environmental Justice and legal geography literatures.
21

There are geographies embedded in the risk society that suggest multiple scales
of political and economic power are produced in this trend. For example, the same
uneven development that brings industrialization to the neoliberal, deregulated US
South (Cobb 1993) also brought with it uneven industrial exposures in black and brown
communities (Bullard 2000). Communities that desperately needed employment
opportunities and tax revenue have participated in the "race to the bottom" for highrisk industries on a regional scale. On other scales, the risk society is defined, in part,
by a reliance on expert knowledge to mediate between the scientific world and the
world of economic development, which operate in less localized institutional and social
arrangements through national bureaucratic agencies such as the EPA. This mirrors the
tendency in neoliberalism to rely on a world of international experts to drive economic
and political policy such as the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. In
both risk society and neoliberal society, the impetus for decision-making is decidedly
"top-down," from the risk society's scientific intelligentsia class to neoliberalism's
academic and policy elite.
Nancy Fraser argues we are in a period of "abnormal justice," where the formal
systems and discourses that society has constructed to achieve justice are proving
themselves to be decreasingly applicable to modern claims of injustice. This
assessment hinges largely on the diminishing relevance of the Westphalian system of
22

organizing statehood and citizenship in the wake of an increasingly globalized
civilization.
In our most recent moment of "normal justice"—which she defines as being in
the midcentury, after WWII, sometime before the deeply globalized present—the
"Keynesian-Westphalian" (Fraser 2010, 12) imagination dominated the ways in which
justice was conceived, sought, and dispensed. In the Westphalian political imagination,
the "domestic" and "international" spheres of legal and political space are distinct
(ibid, 12), limiting the bounds of justice claims to national geographic units. Only a few
issues were "international"—famines, genocides, refugee crises (ibid, 13), but the
framing of such conflicts still hinged on the national unit. Similarly, the global economic
system, managed through the Bretton-Woods agreement, relegated economic
distribution to the national unit, and, at least in the Western context, claims for
redistributive justice were sought through a Keynesian "moral economy" framework
(Ibid, 12; Harvey 2007).
However, major shifts in the economic organization of the world, particularly
driven by the onset of global neoliberalism, have created a moment of "abnormal
justice" where the Westphalian national unit has become an inadequate scale for
addressing many claims of injustice. She argues that emerging claims of injustice at this
moment in history struggle with "radical heterogeneity" and "incommensurability" in
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the way justice systems assess claims. It is because the claims coming forward are
qualitatively distinct — radically heterogeneous—and difficult, if not impossible, to
measure with any degree of impartiality—they are incommensurable within the current
Westphalian model.

Legal Geography & Environmental Justice
Recent reviews throughout the discipline of geography have called for more
substantial engagement with the way in which law forms space, place, and scale
(Barkan 2013, Delaney 2015, Kurtz 2003, Walker et al 2009). Rather than viewing law as
a taken-for-granted norm, these calls urge a critical view of the law and the systems of
power it embeds and naturalizes during globalization (Barkan 2009), landscape
production (Mitchell 2013), and racialization (Kurtz 2003). These calls have a resonant
unity when viewed through the lens of Environmental Justice, where people mired in
racialized inequality challenge global scales of power by confronting corporations
responsible for deadly pollution in their communities.
My research examines the law's role in creating new geographies by critically
examining the conceptions of justice that are included and excluded from
environmental settlement and cleanup agreements, interrogating the multiple scales of
power that become inscribed in those geographies (Barkan 2009, Kurtz 2003), and
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understanding how they are expressed in the landscape (Mitchell 2013) and in
geographies of memory (Till 2014). The way settlements are designed and
implemented is instructive for answering questions about the interactions between the
law, the environment, and community stakeholders (corporations, citizens, local and
regional governance) and for the ways the landscape changes wrought by remedial
agreements impact understandings of Environmental Justice.
I also explore how movement actors push beyond the realm of the legal in
search of justice. This brings alternatives to current modes of justice to the fore,
including restorative notions of justice (Inwood 2012; Kurki 2000; Llewellyn and Howse
1999). In the context of the US South, a region that has been a major target of
environmental racism, and one that is also mired in legal injustices through what many
increasingly argue is a white-supremacist legal system (Alexander 2012), one of the
ways in which geographers can contribute to innovating new modes of justice is to
conduct analyses that empower notions of space and place conceived from the
"bottom-up," rather than relying on the present modes of expert-driven authority.
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Justice and Legal beings:
Claims, Grievances and Corporate Personhood

Claims for legal recognition are framed in two ways 1) in regard for the need for
a place in the political order—what Fraser describes as "ordinary political
injustices...when skewed decision rules compromise the political voice of some who are
already counted as members, impairing their ability to participate as peers in social
interaction" (Fraser 2010, 6). This draws into question the ordinary modes of liberal
democratic systems: are electoral voting mechanisms sufficient means of representing
the political body (Ibid, 19)? Further, is a system that is blind to identity, but claims
political equality, actually following through with that claim (Ibid, 19)?
These are questions endemic to liberal democratic systems whose main concern
is to ensure political equality for all while also privileging individual rights above all
others (Purcell 2008, 40). This is bound in a negative conceptualization of rights and
liberties wherein protection from state tyranny includes protection from obligation. If
there are no formal restrictions from being able to vote, participate in public life, and
be represented in the political system then the system is working.
Redistributive claims are the most econometric of the three types Fraser
elaborates upon, as they seek justice through an egalitarian distribution of resources
throughout society. She cites organizations such as labor unions as being emblematic
26

organizational apparatuses for these claims (Fraser 2010, 103), but during much of the
labor movement's heyday, redistributive claims were not extended to everyone. They
were limited to the national framework, and they often only included white men,
because of the racial exclusivity of many labor unions (Mandel 1955) and the lack of
labor organization rights granted sectors of the economy where nonwhite workers were
most prevalent (Meltzer 1974).
This discussion highlights a moment representation comes into tension with
claims around redistribution in the US context. According to liberal logic, the state
should only be concerned with reducing its interference in people’s personal lives, not
necessarily with promoting a “positive” conception of rights. This would entail
“ensure[ing] the provision of people’s basic needs so that they are free to flourish to
the best of their abilities” (Purcell 2008, 41). Many of the fights for civil rights in the
United States have hinged on these representational claims, including the right to vote,
the right to exist in public space, and most importantly, the right to be recognized as a
citizen, regardless of skin color. While these advances certainly allowed greater
participation in the formal system, they did not necessarily align with what would be
considered "equality," a more economically redistributive concept. Martin Luther King,
quoted in Dawson’s Black Visions, touches on this tension:
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“There is not even a common language when the term ‘equality’ is used.
Negro and white have a fundamentally different definition. Negroes have
proceeded from a premise that equality means what it says, and have
taken white Americans at their word when they talked of it as an
objective. But most whites…proceed from a premise that equality is a
loose expression for improvement” (Dawson 267).
This tension is palpable because the very logic of negative rights that was used
to justify racially progressive reforms, which mainly focused on advancing
representation, was also used to justify their retreat. During the 1970s economic crisis
and later, in the 1980s under the Reagan administration, policy became radically more
conservative and pro-white than in previous decades, as Reagan and Bush took a
strong anti-affirmative action stance (Browne-Marshall 2007), claiming that such policies
gave additional privileges to nonwhite people, promoting unfair advancement. Part of
what made this possible lies in the ambiguity of anti-discrimination law, which makes it
difficult to “defend its genuine interests against those whose interests are supported
by opposing visions that also lie within the same discourse” (Crenshaw 1988, 1349).
For opponents of many civil rights advances, equal representation was being
stripped from white Americans with policies like affirmative action, even going so far as
to call these policies “reverse discrimination” or “reverse racism” (Omi and Winant
1994) because they supposedly levied advantages to people of color that were
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unavailable to white people. The epistemological stance of the “colorblind” or
“raceless society” was being applied to preserve privilege instead of progress the
disadvantaged, and this was legally possible because of the state’s imperative to
prioritize individual liberty above group interests.
Recognition, and who can legally claim it, is debated on a number of fronts:
"...group identity, autonomous achievement, or autonomous
personhood; cultural distinctiveness, individual achievement, or
autonomous personhood; cultural distinctiveness, common humanity, or
the claimant's standing as a partner in a social interaction (Fraser 2010,
32). "
What political unit deserves the recognition of the law? In my estimation, this
tenet of Fraser's argument pushes the boundaries of the law the furthest in claims for
racial justice. Claims for recognition demand an alternative.
Legally, personhood is closely connected to how and for whom rights are
defined and protected. The notion of corporate personhood draws the power of the
concept into sharp focus. Personhood has been utilized strategically over time to
ascribe rights to certain beings, entities, and institutions over the course of the history
of United States. Conversely, the denial of personhood has been used to strip rights
from certain beings and institutions over the course of that same history. This draws
into question the morality of the use of personhood at all:
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The concept of personhood, has a dual function: (1) It protects those considered
persons against suffering the hurts and indignities which the selfish tendencies
of human psychology could inflict on them, and (2) it justifies treating those not
considered persons selfishly. By assigning them moral rights, the concept of
personhood protects some from being treated merely as means to human
satisfaction. By denying them moral rights, the concept of personhood, justifies
treating others, that is, those considered property or creatures of nature, merely
as means to human satisfaction. Is it morally acceptable and preferable to have a
concept which functions in this way? (Sapontzis 1981, 617)

For other types of entities that have and enjoy legal personhood, the struggle
for legal recognition has been less difficult. It is particularly telling that nonhuman
entities, such as corporations, are able to be recognized as persons in a legal sense.
Thus they are able to enjoy some of the same rights that an individual person has. How
is this possible? Graver (1999) argues that it is wrapped up in the way that the court is
able to define persons:
To recognize an entity as a person, the court asks to what extent the entity acts
as an individual agent. Because corporations can act with purposes distinct from
those of the people that comprise them, the court is disposed to accept
corporations as people. After all, corporations are vividly in action before the
law. They obligate themselves (but none of the humans that make them up)
through contracts. They sue and are sued. They carry out projects, deliver goods
and services, collect and distribute money, hire and fire employees. An extreme
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version of the real entity theory would end its analysis here and declare the
corporation just as much a person as any living human being because it acts
individually in the world and is liable for its actions just like any human being
(Graver 1999, 242-243).
In order to see why a corporation would prefer to be treated as an individual, it
is important to understand the reasoning for an incorporation in the first place. The
corporation is a business entity in which ownership is held by multiple shareholders.
Shareholders are entitled to profit from the corporation’s activities, but they are not
necessarily involved in the day-to-day operations of the corporation. For that there is
usually a Board of Directors or some form of leadership in place. Corporations have
birthdays but not death dates; they are intended to extend the life of wealth and
capital beyond a single generation. The corporation itself can be held liable, can be
sued and counter-sue, can enter agreements, and generally function as an individual
businessperson while its existence is predicated on its ownership and control by
multiple actors. The overarching value of incorporation, however, is to protect the
personal property of individuals (Pollman 2011).

Litigation & Justice
Throughout the history of the United States, litigation has been a "go-to"
strategy for many in social movements to attempt to bring progressive change to major
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institutions. The decision to engage in litigation is heavily influenced by the legacy of
previous successes, most notably the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision.
Social movement actors move fairly fluidly between causes throughout their lives, and
they bring with them their experiences of success and failure that influence future
decisions. The decision to litigate is influenced by the actors' previous experiences,
combined with the climate of political opportunity which often facilitates the ability to
emulate previous strategies for social change (Boutcher 2013).
However, in spite of some landmark victories, the empirical impacts of the many
decisions to engage in litigation are unclear, at best. Institutional barriers embedded in
litigious strategies make it difficult for alternatives to be proposed. Scholars argue that
limited liberal legal logic restricts the scope of the problems that may be addressed
and the solutions that may be proposed (NeJaime 2011, 950-1). Even landmark civil
rights cases such as Brown v. Board of Education have been critiqued in light of their
limits. Rosenberg and Klarman's study (as cited in Nejaime 2010) found that the judge's
decision alone did not spur desegregation of schools, nor did it massively change
public opinion or cause great reaction within the African American community. They
write that the "claim that a major contribution of the courts in civil rights was to give
the issue salience, press political elites to act, prick the consciences of whites,
legitimate the grievances of blacks, and fire blacks up to act is not substantiated"
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(Nejaime 2010, 951). Further, many scholars extend this pessimistic view by noting that
segregation still exists, as does massive racialized inequality in the public school
system, drawing the utility of the decision even deeper into question in the long view
(Bell 2004).
NeJaime offers a different perspective on the outcomes of litigation. A positive
outcome in court makes it easier for organizers to frame issues and construct
campaigns around enforcing a legal decision, it raises consciousness and awareness of
a particular problem, and it provides a central post around which groups can form their
identity (NeJaime 2011, 954-955). Furthermore, these engagements may increase a
movement's bargaining power, connections, and in the event of victory, authoritative
affirmation of the movement's central aims (NeJaime 2011).
On the other hand, the legal literature gives the impression that there is a great
deal of pressure to settle out of court: "Since the court dockets are overflowing with
lawsuits, all else equal, litigants should be encouraged to resolve their disputes
privately through out-of-court settlement" (Spier 1994, 84). The vast majority of all
cases do settle, in part because the incentive to settle is high when compared with the
cost of going to court. The decision is most often framed as an economic one: "When
two litigants resolve a dispute through out-of-court settlement rather than trial, they
realize joint gains of trade equal to the sum of the costs both parties would have
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incurred had they obtained a trial judgment minus the costs they incur reaching
settlement" (Korobkin and Guthrie 1994, 1).
Because of the costs involved, and the "winner take all" outcome of going to
trial, trials are often considered failures within the legal profession (Lederman 1999,
319). However, there could be a multitude of additional factors that influence this
decision beyond economics. For example, Korobkin and Guthrie (1994) argue that the
style and strategy behind the negotiation process can greatly impact the likelihood of
successful negotiations. There is also a good deal of discussion about the (a)symmetry
of the information about the lawsuit between the two parties, and how that information
is shared during the negotiation process (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986).
If the state itself is engaged in a project of racial exploitation and domination,
then why does Environmental Justice activism so frequently center its efforts in the
litigious arena? What are the limitations of that kind of engagement?
With her studies of Environmental Justice in southern California, Laura Pulido
spearheaded the effort to bring Environmental Justice to the fore inside the discipline
of Geography (Pulido 2000; Pulido 2014). One of the main problems in this field has
been the issue of conceptual framing, as the imperatives for justice press against the
scales at which justice can be achieved (Kurtz 2003): at what scale does one assess
responsibility for claims of injustice, and whose claims are legitimate?
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While litigation may quell a conflict in one area, the underlying problem
remains, if not for the individual or group involved, then for the people in the
neighboring town who have tin ore under their feet waiting to be extracted, or the
children living next to an open field that is being considered as the next landfill
location for a chemical company. Pollution, sickness, and the general neglect of human
welfare are symptomatic of a broader problem in legal systems’ (de)valuation of human
life.

Memory, Power, Place, and Justice
How we remember and why, shape how societies and social actors place
themselves in the world. Geographic research has amassed a wide range of theoretical
and empirical work in understanding the impacts of memory in the landscape, and how
collective and individual memory is formed and deployed on multiple scales and in
multiple venues. Following, I examine some of these dimensions of memory research,
assaying how memory is used to express identity, how it holds power, and how it
shapes place through "memory work" in places such as museums, memorials, and
grassroots/vernacular sites of memory. I discuss why geographers would connect
studies of race and justice to geographies of memory, both from theoretical and
research praxis perspectives.
35

The way in which people construct and deploy memory can be seen "as a social
activity, as an expression and active force of group identity" (Hoelscher and Alderman
2004, 348). One of the most important aspects of memory is the power it wields, or can
potentially wield, in society: "...social memory is inherently instrumental: individuals
and groups recall the past not for its own sake, but as a tool to bolster different aims
and agendas" (ibid, 349). The power of memory to shape identity and to express
power has been of particular interest to geographers. For some, memory may be a
grounding force in a world of "rapid social transformation" as in some ways grounded
identities have been lost in "unrelenting social-political-economic forces that have
come to be called globalization" (Azaryahu and Foote 2007, 349). In large-scale
national memory projects, wherein versions of national identity are expressed through
memory projects such as memorials to wars and other historical events, memory is
used as a tool to build the relevance of the nation-state. In the "post-Westphalian"
context of the national body, borders are theorized to be decreasingly relevant with
the rise of transnational identity and state formations (Fraser 2010), and memory
deployed in the service of nationalism can be a powerful force that grounds identity in
place.
This observation connects memory to material expressions of power; memorials
and memorial landscapes often reflect the power structures and regimes that created
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them (Azaryahu and Foote 2007), communicating selectively about historical events,
figures, and valued identity characteristics (Till 2005). These expressions are frequently
tied to an effort to build national cohesion as "hegemonic forces in society manipulate
historical memory to legitimize their authority" (Foote and Azaryahu 2007, 130). The
rhetorical and discursive construction of such events is deeply influenced by memory
actors’ agendas, leading to representations of significant people and events that may
be altered and/or sanitized to satisfy various political motives (DeLyser 1999). This has
resulted in significant, powerful biases in the remembrance of events throughout the
world that influence the lens through which the public is able to interpret modern
social issues.
Among the many reasons why some events are remembered more frequently
and clearly than others are the lack of invested individuals to bring obscured events to
the collective fore as important moments for reflection, debate, and learning (Fine and
McDonnell 2007, 171; Foote 2003). As a result, decisions regarding which events
should be remembered publicly through concrete acts such as commemoration and
memorialization often remain in the hands of those with enough resources, influence,
and institutional connections to ensure the survival of those memories (Dwyer 2000).
This can result in "historical amnesia" (Foote and Azaryahu 2007, 129), wherein
events unimportant to the narratives espoused by the powerful are omitted and
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thereby forgotten. Not all sites with great social significance are necessarily recognized
by the state or actors powerful enough to construct formal memorial sites. As Dwyer
and Alderman (2008, 168) note, "...the social process of remembering is accompanied,
simultaneously, by a process of forgetting—an excluding of other historical narratives
from public consideration and recognition." No nationalized identity is a completely
inclusive one, rendering discursive analyses of memorial sites and landscapes
particularly important in understanding the complex, contesting meanings of official,
unofficial, and unrecognized sites of memory.
Memory, of course, is expressed on more scales than the national. Karen Till's
notion of wounded cities offers a way to understand memory on the urban scale by
actors who do not necessarily act in any "official" capacity. She argues that places
which have undergone mass violence and histories of displacement are active centers
for "memory work" around those issues, and the memories surrounding these issues
are so ubiquitous that they become integral pieces that shape urban life. In regard to
displacement, she notes how city residents experience "root shock" when confronted
with massive changes in urban environments, changes that create an emotional and
physiological connection to places even when physical relationships have been broken.
"When places are physically demolished, not only is the stability of the taken-forgranted rhythms destroyed, an individual's personal and intrasubjective emotional
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ecosystems become damaged (root shock)" (Till 2012, 10). As a result, people attempt
to create healing places in the wake of such damage through artistic and activist work
to maintain emotional connections to those places, and to articulate alternative
political visions. "Materially, memory-work motivates the creation of social capital,
provides a range of memorialization activities, creates new forms of pubic memory, and
is committed to intergenerational education and social outreach" (Till 2012, 7). For
people who have experienced displacement and marginalization, this work can simply
beg for people to become visible, to stake their claim in a landscape and urban system
that renders them invisible and not valuable. Her work highlights the "performative"
nature of memorial expressions (see also Dwyer and Alderman 2008), where memory is
invoked through (a number of ways but in this instance) political protest and artistic
activism. Till’s research is an important contribution to understanding how social
groups actively resist annihilation from the landscape by deploying the political
implications of memory work.
These examples demonstrate that memory is potentially a powerful tool for
advocating and acting for transformative social justice. Memorial sites, for instance,
"are important conduits not just giving voice to certain visions of history, but casting
legitimacy upon them—a way of ordering and controlling the public meaning of the
past" (Alderman and Inwood 2013). The act of bringing marginalized voices to the fore
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through memory projects, then, provides a venue for legitimation (Dwyer and
Alderman 2008); similarly, the act of contesting memorial landscapes from oppressive
regimes legitimizes the struggles of the oppressed. Landscapes, again borrowing
Dwyer and Alderman's (2008) framework, can be analyzed discursively, disentangling
the textual metaphors defining memorial sites and projects, as arenas of politicized
conflict and debate, and as areas of memorial participation, where people actively
shape memorial landscapes and sites. These overlapping perspectives and analytical
tools can be used not just to understand the official narratives that memorials present,
but can also help scholars and society understand and appreciate who and what is
missing from our memorial landscapes, and why. Understanding these invisible
narratives is an important project that also extends beyond wanting a “just”
representation in memorials. From a broader perspective, it is about learning as a
society to value one another enough to be inclusive in the first place when constructing
memorial projects, and to engage with the past through multiple historical and
geographic perspectives even if they conflict with one another. "Like all cultural
landscapes, memorials have a normative power, at once reflecting and reproducing
social ideas about the past, and thereby shaping the future" (Dwyer and Alderman
2008, 167). If the future we want is one that values participation, democracy, and
inclusion, then a good place to start is to make sure the way we communicate about
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our society is inclusive, embraces debate, and allows the people most impacted by the
events we memorialize the ability to participate in their construction.
Throughout the course of this dissertation, these literatures build upon one
another to build a synthesis between the legal geography, political economy, and
memory. The Anniston case study is a microcosm of how these seemingly disparate
ideas and processes interact to shape the outcomes of struggles for Environmental
Justice. Chapter 3 examines the way corporations strategically manipulate scale to gain
power, Chapter 4 dissects the details of the legal settlement agreement to understand
the structural biases ingrained into Environmental Justice legal and policy systems, and
Chapter 5 explores how memory can inform cleanup agreements to provide a more
holistic perspective on remediation.
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CHAPTER 3
CORPORATE SCALAR TRANSFORMATIONS AND THE PRODUCTION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUALITIES IN ANNISTON, ALABAMA

42

Abstract
Anniston is home to a struggle for Environmental Justice that has marked the
city for several decades. The Monsanto Company placed Anniston on the map as one
of the most toxic cities in United States because of its negligent disposal of
Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) in the city’s soil, water, and air. In the wake of the
pollution and its impacts on the city, Monsanto has shifted its “persona” in ways that
are instructive for understanding the power of corporate identity, how it shapes
corporations’ relationships with legal systems and other state bodies, and how it
impacts the production of space as communities seek to recover from corporate-driven
environmental degradation. As scholars work toward comprehensive solutions to
environmental inequalities, it is imperative to understand environmental inequalities in
relation to the ways corporate actors and institutions strategically utilize and transform
scale to ensure their survival. Drawing on literatures in legal geography, critical
economic geography, and broader theoretical debates about the production of scale,
this work, based on field research in Anniston, identifies how corporations produce
identities that allow them to function with a great deal of flexibility as compared to
other actors who become embroiled in struggles over environmental injustices.
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Introduction
Much of the archival research for this dissertation was conducted in the main
branch of the Anniston Public Library. The library is always bustling, particularly with
internet users – people filling out job applications, browsing, listening to music. One
day, while taking a break in the periodicals, a young man approached me and asked
what I had been working on all day. (Most of the library is one large room, so there is
not much anonymity or expectation of privacy to be had.) I told him I was researching
Monsanto and the PCB pollution in Anniston. Typically, when I talked to Annistonians
about this topic there was a familiar groan of understanding – “oh, it’s awful isn’t it,
really terrible what happened.” However, I was stunned by this young man’s reply:
“But, isn’t Monsanto responsible for feeding half the world?”
Admittedly, he was not entirely wrong–Monsanto has had a major impact on the
global agricultural system. However, there is something else to work through in this
interaction: Anniston, Alabama, ground zero for one of Monsanto’s worst pollution
disasters, seems like one of the most unlikely places in the world to find a Monsanto
defender. However, in the long view of Monsanto’s activity in Anniston, it makes more
sense: Monsanto was a very important part of the community even while it was
engaging in practices that were actively eroding the quality of life in the city. On the
local scale, for many years Monsanto crafted a relatively positive identity as a
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benevolent employer. On a national, or even global scale, Monsanto was able to
construct a progressive identity. For most of Monsanto’s history, it was known primarily
as an industrial chemical company rather than a biotechnology company, and its
advertising claimed that its products were used to advance the modern world.
This analysis examines Monsanto’s transitions over time in the context of
growing public awareness of environmental issues and a rapidly developing
environmental regulatory system in the US, also known as the “risk society.” This
analysis shows how corporate actors use scale and a legally flexible identity to mitigate
the legal, financial, and environmental impacts of their productive activities. As scholars
work toward comprehensive solutions to environmental inequalities, it is imperative to
understand them in relation to the multi-scalar strategies of corporate actors and
institutions. Drawing on literatures in legal geography, critical economic geography,
and broader theoretical debates about the production of scale, this work identifies how
corporations produce identities that allow them to function with a great deal of
flexibility as compared to other actors who become embroiled in struggles over
environmental injustices.
In this chapter, I argue that corporations construct different identities according
to the scale at which they seek to become powerful or maintain power relations.
Corporations employ these identities in order to occupy strategic scalar positions that
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allow them to survive and create advantages for themselves within legal and state
systems, unavailable to other legal individuals. Corporations transform themselves
regularly with activities such as acquisitions, mergers, and divestments. These activities
may seem to be mundane financial transactions, occurring in some a-spatial realm of
financial capital. The material significance of these activities becomes more apparent
when understood as strategic endeavors to shape a corporation’s ability to survive
across multiple scales, directly influencing the production of space and place.
This chapter traces how corporate actors strategically produced and transformed
Monsanto’s identities at different scales over time to 1) produce a chemical known to
be dangerous within such close proximity to a residential district, 2) to reduce anxiety
about the danger of their operations, and 3) survive in the wake of litigation. Such
mundane corporate activities have important impacts on the production of space, the
experience of place, and the struggle to achieve Environmental Justice. In this analysis,
geographic scale is a frame for understanding the development of corporate political
and economic strategies to 1) cultivate collective consent to risk and 2) engender a
pro-business, if higher-risk environment.
Next, a brief overview of relevant literatures contextualizes this case within the
political-economic framework of the “risk society,” and discusses how this conceptual
framework intersects with geographic theorizing about scale and Environmental
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Justice. The case study is a discourse analysis of newspaper coverage, internal
corporate communications, and corporate publications and advertisements to analyze
the transformations of The Monsanto Chemical Company’s identity in Anniston. The
shifting political context of environmental risk guided the company’s discursive and
material scalar transformations, a process instructive for understanding the strategic
use of scale by corporate entities in the wake of environmental conflicts.

Risk Society, Neoliberalism, and Scale
The motivation undergirding this analysis has two key components: first, there is
relatively little critical literature about the specific strategies deployed by corporate
actors in Environmental Justice conflicts (Prechel and Zheng 2012). It is strategically
important in the struggle for justice in these scenarios to understand more clearly the
specific moves and strategies of corporations as they seek justice from their
perspectives.
Second, this analysis can lend insight on the relationships that corporations form
with legal bodies, state bodies, and state actors to gain/retain power in the US political
economy. Corporations are powerful entities in the United States, most popularly
known as such because of the financial power they hold in electoral politics. However, I
argue that the power they employ is much more widespread and mundanely practiced
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through the relationships they cultivate with state agencies such as the EPA, and
through agreements and cleanup processes such as the one in Anniston. Corporations
play a key role in cultivating the culture and practice of state-sanctioned neglect,
thereby playing a part in the production of racialized spaces of inequality in the US
Anniston’s story is important to understand within the context of the broader
trajectory of US-led global industrialization, wherein the distribution and management
of risks have become an important aspect of modern life. Ulrich Beck (1993) argues that
as modernization has improved living conditions due to technological and industrial
innovations, collective risks emerged, threatening the survival of humanity. For
example, PCB pollution takes hundreds of years to decompose and causes serious
diseases, yet PCBs were a key component of the expansion of the electrical grid
throughout the mid-20th century. Some level of risk was collectively accepted
throughout their use. As a result, new social and institutional arrangements have
formed to reckon with hazards endemic to modern, industrialized societies (Cable et al.
2008, Ekberg 2007), such as CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act), the EPA, and the notion of corporate environmental
responsibility.
The “risk society” has developed in tandem with neoliberalism, which has been
shown to heighten the potential for collective environmental risks. Industrial and labor
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deregulation can result in higher potential risks for accidents and exposures to
substances that are harmful to human health (Bullard 2000). The US South participates
in an (increasingly) nationwide “race-to-the-bottom” for such regulations (Woods
2006). States compete to attract industry and corporate investment by eliminating any
potential barriers to the “free market” (Harvey 2007). However, Environmental Justice
movements have raised attention to the fact that the same neoliberal deregulation that
attracts heavy industries to the US South (Cobb 1993) also brings with it uneven
exposures along the lines of racial identity (Bullard 2000). Heightening deregulation
increases environmental risks to vulnerable populations, meaning that the neoliberal
era has seen increased systemic environmental violence directed at poor communities
of color (Pellow 2016).
The different scales at which risks are experienced, determined, and mediated
raises questions about how key actors within the risk society produce unequal scalar
configurations of political and economic power. Though geography has seen a robust
debate about the nature of scale (see especially Brenner 2001, Marston and Smith
2001), this research draws specifically on the notion that scale is socially produced
(Marston and Smith 2001). There is not a fixed scalar hierarchy of local, national, global,
or otherwise to which certain issues/people/institutions inherently belong. Instead,
scale is constantly being actively created and reworked to advance particular
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understandings of the world. While there is a materiality to scale – for example, in the
way states divide bureaucratic systems on local, regional, and national levels – this
approach denaturalizes these hierarchies and provides an analytical framework to
understand for what purposes they are produced.
In this sense, scale is a more than an analytical concept, but is also a powerful
tool. Kurtz (2003) uses the framing concept to analyze when and how scale is being
summoned and created, how actors connect scales, and the purpose of scale in
struggles to gain power. This kind of understanding is important because, according to
Swyngedouw (2004), the production of scale is intimately tied to "struggles for control
and empowerment" (33). Kurtz’s (2003) notion of “scale frames” and “counter scale
frames” explains the discursive constructions of responsibility and blame utilized by
activists fighting the construction of a PVC production facility in Louisiana. Using
Swyngedouw and Kurtz, this paper employs the analytical concept of “framing” and
joins it with the idea that scales are produced. The result is being able to view different
lenses through which corporate entities in Anniston constructed scalar framings and
understandings to diminish and mitigate risks wrought by their chemical production
activities in the city. As such, when viewing corporations, a number of scalar
positionalities can be simultaneously present, depending on the political, economic,
social, and geographic context. This creates a way into understanding the nuance and
50

multi-pronged scalar strategy embedded in corporate environmental governance, a
level of scalar manipulation and power that is much harder for ordinary people to
harness.

Case Study: Corporate Scalar Transformations and A Struggle for
Environmental Justice
Monsanto’s Early Corporate Identity
The story of Monsanto’s involvement in Anniston can be confusing, in no small
part because Monsanto is no longer directly involved in the Anniston situation at all. In
fact, the only obvious marker left by Monsanto in the City of Anniston is a lone street
sign (figure 1) – Monsanto Avenue – off of Highway 202 near the chemical factory
where Monsanto was once located.
Monsanto’s absence from Anniston’s landscape reflects decades of strategic corporate
transformations made by the company in order to mitigate the impacts of growing
awareness of the environmental risks posed by their products on multiple scales.
Early in its development, Monsanto was primarily a chemical company,
specializing in a wide variety of products but gaining early prominence in the early
1900s as a manufacturer of the artificial sweetener saccharin (Spears 2014, 34-35).
Many of the company’s most profitable products facilitated rapid industrialization and
infrastructure development. For example, the development and production of Aroclors
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(the branded name for PCBs), exemplifies this trend, as it was used as an industrialgrade insulant, largely for electrical plants and throughout the power grid in
transformer boxes on utility poles.

Figure 1 Monsanto Rd. Photo by author.

Originally manufactured in Anniston by the Swann Chemical Company (Spears 2014),
Monsanto acquired the Anniston plant in 1935 (Spears 2014, 57). With the growth of
electrical connectivity came the expansion of the market for PCBs, and the growth of
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the geography that PCBs impacted, a sobering reality that would only be revealed in
the coming decades as knowledge of the substance’s toxicity became widely known.
Therefore, Monsanto’s early corporate identity was closely tied with the
chemical industry’s role in industrial development and modern life. In a 1938 booklet,
“The Story of Monsanto Company,” the company describes a history of chemistry,
commenting:
Thus the chemical industry was born of the union of scientific knowledge and
the needs of industry. How rapid has been its growth is evidenced by the almost
unbelievable fact that we are not in some way brought into contact with many
things in the production of which chemistry and chemical products have played
a vital, although often unseen, part. Practically everything we eat and wear,
every article we touch or smell, a large part of what we see and much of what we
hear, somewhere along the line of their production came in contact with
chemicals.
Figure 2 is an image from the same booklet drives the company’s point home—
“home” in the sense that Monsanto frames its scalar identity as both a key player in
modernization—nationally, perhaps even globally—all while Monsanto is an integral
part of one’s mundane personal life. “The morning shave” becomes both a moment of
self care and a moment to marvel at the advancements of modern chemistry.
Monsanto communicates power in this scalar identity construction through its ubiquity
and inescapability. Akin to modernization itself, the whole of the world is wrapped up
in the project of industrial progress, including the customer enjoying the fruits of
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Figure 2 The Morning Shave.
modernity in their morning routine. In this way, Monsanto also quietly constructs
consent to experience risk; the integration of chemistry into everyday life implicates
everyone enjoying the fruits of modernization in the potential (as-yet) unknown
consequences.
The final sentence of the passage from Monsanto’s booklet – “Practically
everything we eat and wear, every article we touch or smell, a large part of what we
see and much of what we hear, somewhere along the line of their production came in
contact with chemicals” —rings especially true for the people who worked in
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Monsanto’s factories and lived in their vicinity. On the local scale, in close proximity to
the production of these modern benefits, the ubiquity of industrial chemistry took on a
very different meaning. Anniston Monsanto workers and residents living near the
factory were regularly exposed to levels of PCBs that Monsanto corporate executives
knew were extremely hazardous, well before the formal ban of PCBs in 1979 (Spears
2014). “Every article we touch or smell” in West Anniston may very well have been
subject to PCB exposures greater than in any other place in the United States.
In contrast, the company was forging a positive identity for itself in the city as a
gracious employer and community presence, acting in direct contrast with the
company’s pollution. The 1953 and 1954 issues of the company’s magazine for the
Anniston Plant, “The Record Buster,” pictured in figures 3 and 4, advertised community
activities such as bowling leagues and golf tournaments, commemorations of workers
winning safety awards, and columns giving safety tips and advice on accident
prevention. Company Christmas parties and picnics, while racially segregated, earn
considerable space in the magazine, depicting well-dressed employees playing games,
dancing, and celebrating with their families. This contrast between the company’s
active environmental negligence and the company’s active community presence is
evidence of the strategy in the production of a scaled identity. On a local scale,
creating the identity of trusted community steward through corporate literature makes
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the active poisoning of the surrounding community more difficult to digest in
retrospect. In addition, it is a way in which collective consent to risk is constructed;
while yes, the products in the plant may be dangerous, the jobs and quality of life that
surround that production process are appealing. Thus, those who may have known
about the negative implications of the pollution in the city had some ability to decide
that the benefits outweighed the risk – at least in the short term.
During this period, Monsanto balanced two scalar identities: a global
company that was ushering in the modern world, and a friendly place to work in a small
town. These identities worked in tandem to construct a collective, if uninformed,
consent to risk from industrial chemicals because of the lifestyle and modern
conveniences that came from that trade-off. However, this identity was not to last, as
Monsanto’s products started causing trouble on a global scale, as PCBs were
increasingly linked to human illnesses and environmental problems. In order to survive,
it had to engineer a transformation of its identity on both a global and local scale,
rendering major changes in the corporation’s global and local scalar relationships over
time.
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Figure 3 The Record Buster. January 1964, page 2.
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Figure 4 The Record Buster. January 1964, page 4.
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Trouble in Chemical Paradise
Monsanto started experiencing financial and public relations difficulties in the
late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. This time period was cited by future Solutia
executive Dennis Canver as an early time of transition for the company in a speech,
“How Solutia Became Its Own Company” at an engineering conference in 1998,
stating that Monsanto was responding to the 1979 global oil crisis by investing in
biotechnology, and “systematically began to shed underperforming businesses –
mostly in the chemicals area.” This period marks a crisis in Monsanto’s identity as a
great innovator of modern life through chemistry as collective consent to the risks of
chemical exposure began to whither.
While Canver’s narrative cites global economic crises as a main factor of the
transition, and paints Monsanto as a company adapting to a changing global business
climate through shifts in investment, he omits that at the time, the US was leading the
world by regulating the emission of toxic chemicals in the environment (Spears 2014).
Environmental movements across the world took notice of the global impacts of
chemicals such as PCBs and pesticides (Carson 2002), and as a result companies like
Monsanto were facing greater scrutiny than ever before.
In fact, the year Canver cites, 1979, is the very same year that the US banned the
production and use of PCBs. The Anniston plant was one of just two manufacturing
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facilities for PCBs in the United States. As a result of this legislation, one of Monsanto’s
most profitable products was illegal, and forced the company to transform its global
corporate identity. The transition away from industrial chemistry and toward
biotechnology was a strategy to maintain Monsanto’s identity at both the cusp of
innovative science and the height of profitability, a new frontier for global
modernization. This mirrors the way Beck (1993) discusses the risk society; due to new
knowledge construction about the dangers some chemicals posed to society, it
became imperative for governing bodies, and corporate bodies, to learn to manage
that risk in such a way that fewer people would be endangered by it – or as in
Monsanto’s case, profitability would not be risked by a growing environmental
awareness.
This transition was not limited to PCB production. Locally in Anniston, Monsanto
officials also halted the manufacture of Parathion, a controversial insecticide, citing a
“global restructuring” that was taking place on a company-wide level (Edwards 1985).
Parathion, like PCBs, came under scrutiny at a grassroots level because of its toxicity.
Canver’s omission of the environmental activism surrounding the company’s
restructuring, signals how Monsanto and Solutia were able to actively produce an
alternative scalar frame (Kurtz 2003) of the company’s transformation. Rather than a
response to wide environmental criticism, Monsanto simply made an economically
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rational move in a complex global business climate. This allowed the company to
appear in control and powerful when, in fact, its means of subsistence – industrial
chemistry — was under heavy assault at that time.
This assault was felt more acutely on the local scale. This transition threatened
Monsanto’s survival as the friendly neighborhood employer, and many people in the
city suddenly faced the prospect of unemployment. “I feel like somebody’s died. I
really hate it. They’ve benefitted a lot of people,” said Melvin Womack, an Anniston
community member, quoted in The Anniston Star (Sapers 1985). By the late 1980s,
however, Monsanto was beginning to recover, and newspaper headlines signified a
new direction for the company’s local identity: “Monsanto gets new Environmental
Permit” (Mullan 1986), “Monsanto has new manager, new plan” (Spoon 1987),
“Monsanto vows to lower emissions” (Saltonstall 1988). Throughout the late 1980s and
early 1990s, Monsanto locally transitioned into a proactive environmental steward, a
new version of the local community steward identity, but with increased public
awareness and with a more proactive and aggressive response to environmental risks.
The underlying strategy behind this transition becomes even clearer when considered
in light of the litigation that would soon assault the company in the early 1990s. Its
transition to environmental steward became a strategic insurance policy against
brimming criticism.
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Shedding Chemical Roots
In the 1990s, Monsanto started buying up properties surrounding its plant in
Anniston. It set up an office in the Sweet Valley-Cobbtown neighborhood, the area of
West Anniston closest to the plant. Residents were offered lump sums of cash for their
properties in exchange for agreements not to litigate in the future. (Chapters 4 and 5
cover these events in greater detail.) In the wake of these buyouts, a group of activists
called Community Against Pollution (CAP) started to investigate the health problems in
this community, drawing connections between the Monsanto factory and the litany of
illnesses plaguing the community. Many people were suffering from cancer, liver
disease, and kidney disease, and other diseases that no one could readily explain.
When CAP and other groups engaged in litigation against Monsanto starting in
the late 1990s, Monsanto used its early environmental “proactivity” as evidence of its
good community stewardship. Discursively placing itself as a caretaker of the
environment, it attempted to soften the blow of the accusations it was facing as an
intentionally negligent polluter. In a climate of increased scrutiny of the impact of
chemicals on the environment, and the enforcement of regulations through legislation
such as CERCLA, Monsanto’s identity transition shielded the company from the
consequences of the modern world it helped create.
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In the following excerpt from a letter to the editor written by Robert G. Kaley, an
environmental affairs director for Solutia, the “proactive environmental steward”
identity comes into play as a defense of criticism levied in an article published in the
Nation called “What Monsanto Knew”:
Monsanto's responses to finding PCBs in the environment were swift and
effective. It dealt with the emerging issues at the highest levels of the company,
committing personnel and resources to learn as much as possible about PCBs
and their potential environmental and health effects. Never before had a
company responded as quickly and as fully to environmental concerns. It
restricted sales to electrical-equipment manufacturers only, in order to prevent
environmental releases; established stringent control practices; sponsored
research on environmental and health effects; and worked closely with state and
federal regulatory agencies.
Despite a federal report that eliminating PCBs would cause severe
disruptions in electrical distribution, Monsanto committed to stop making PCBs
as soon as substitutes were developed. It voluntarily stopped making PCBs in
Anniston in 1971 and ceased making PCBs altogether in 1977, two years before
the EPA ban. For thirty-five years, Monsanto/Solutia has responded
appropriately to PCB issues, based on sound science and effective cleanup
measures” (Kaley 2000).
Here, Kaley draws on Monsanto’s proactivity to defend itself against evidence
presented by journalist Nancy Beiles that it acted irresponsibly. In addition, he draws
on Monsanto’s role in “modernity” through its reference to the risks posed to electrical
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distribution due to the halt in manufacture. He talks about the company’s changes
while reminding the reader of the company’s positive role. While Kaley goes on to say
that it acted quickly once PCBs were discovered in water in 1993, Beiles’ article
provides evidence that Monsanto was aware of the potential extent of the PCB
pollution long before that date, casting doubt on Kaley’s analysis. Beiles’ response to
these criticisms in particular was short, but effective:
While Monsanto did cease the manufacture of PCBs two years before the EPA
banned them, that doesn't mitigate the fact that the company had, for years,
been releasing them into the environment, activity which has created a
contaminated community (Beiles 2000).
Unfazed by Monsanto’s shifts, Beiles sees no difference in the Monsanto of 2000 and
the Monsanto of 1950. No matter what transformations the company may have
undergone, and no matter how “proactive” they may have been in certain respects,
the fact remains for Beiles that Monsanto is responsible.
The final scalar strategic transformation was ultimately, the spinoff of Monsanto’s
chemical division into a new company entirely—the neutrally denominated “Solutia.”
The new name was part of a carefully crafted transition for Monsanto away from the
chemicals business and for Solutia’s quiet, sanitized entrance. Solutia is a rebranded
Monsanto: “We’re an almost 100-year old, brand-new company,” said Solutia
executive Dennis Canver. Solutia lives on in the community—in part, as a prominent
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corporate sponsor of civil rights memorials, a bitter irony that is deeply unsettling
considering its role in the perpetuation of racialized environmental injustice in the city.
Even more recently, Solutia was bought by Eastman chemical, a growing presence
throughout the southern United States. Eastman’s name is also present on Anniston’s
landscape, sponsoring scholarship programs, a teen reading room at the local library,
and participating heavily in the activities of the local Chamber of Commerce. Through
these activities, corporate actors are again rebuilding the company’s identity as a
strong community presence.
For Monsanto, its association with chemical production was rendered toxic by
the many revelations of the company’s malfeasance across the globe (Spears 2014),
and in 1997, it fully transitioned into a biotechnology company when it shed its
chemical holdings. Its global survival as Monsanto was dependent on producing a new
identity, and a new scale of responsibility. The effectiveness of this transition can also
be measured more directly by its financial impacts. On September 8, 1997, The
Anniston Star reported that “Monsanto Co.’s shares have risen 10 percent since it spun
off its chemicals division, as investors bet the company’s agricultural and
pharmaceuticals business will thrive without it” (Clarke 1997). Monsanto, and the trail of
destructive pollution associated with its name, managed to create a new life for its
brand of risk-driven modernization and profitability.
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Conclusion
The scalar transformations deployed by Monsanto have reaped enormous
rewards for corporate actors in the long run. Monsanto remains powerful globally.
Solutia continues to be a community presence, sponsoring scholarship contests and
donating to the local library. In 2008, Solutia declared bankruptcy, a move that many
argue was intended to slow down the cleanup process in Anniston, a move that is more
directly addressed in Chapter 4. In 2012, Solutia emerged from bankruptcy and was
sold to Eastman Chemical for $4.8 billion. Solutia continues to pay for the cleanup of
PCBs in the city, although no human individual was ever legally held responsible for the
pollution in Anniston. While Monsanto/Solutia were held liable, neither entity ever had
to admit fault.
When strategizing solutions for environmental inequalities, it is important to
understand the power that corporations hold within the legal system as both legal
individuals and as entities that are able to undergo transformations like those
described here. More than transfers of ownership, these are transfers of responsibility,
and transformations of scalar relationships that render corporate actors
disproportionately powerful in comparison to ordinary people who face them in a court
of law. By placing Monsanto’s identity transitions in the broader context of the Risk
Society, the construction of different scalar identities for the company – a global force
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of modernization, a local community steward, a victim of the global oil crisis, a
proactive environmental steward – made it possible for the company to survive popular
assaults against its most profitable enterprises. The company’s slow shedding of its
chemical holdings in favor of biotechnology allowed it to become an almost entirely
different company by the time its most contentious litigation came to pass in Anniston,
giving it the ability to lean on its new status as an environmentally responsible, entirely
“new” corporation, to deflect local concerns.
In contrast, West Anniston struggles to survive; the landscape is littered with
abandoned factories, homes, schools, and businesses. The settlement was divided
among over 20,000 plaintiffs, meaning, after legal fees, many received little, if anything
at all. The city attempts to move on from this struggle, but the scars remain.
In the immediate future the power that corporate entities hold in the US justice
systems is concerning, not least of which because the Anniston case teaches they have
the power to reproduce inequalities, even when they are held responsible for social
and environmental degradation. Scholar-activists and activists must strive to innovate
alternate strategies that halt the reproduction of inequalities and uneven development.
In addition, the neoliberal era draws new questions about the role of risk and
development, as a lax regulatory culture impacts environmental policy across scales.
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CHAPTER 4
ANNISTON’S NEOLIBERAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN PRACTICE
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Abstract
The outcomes of the movement for Environmental Justice in Anniston largely center
around the results of a combination of lawsuits which settled for a total of $700 million.
While many residents had high expectations for the outcomes of this settlement, in the
long term, many were disappointed by the way the cleanup was designed and
implemented, and in the size of the settlements they received. This chapter examines
the structural conditions that influenced the outcomes of the settlement, arguing that
neoliberal influences on Environmental Justice policymaking resulted in an outcome
that many viewed as favorable to corporate actors involved and unfair to those most
acutely impacted by the pollution.

Introduction
Legal and scientific authorities rely heavily on scientific “objectivity” and
“expertise” to create authoritative remedial plans and guidelines. These plans calculate
acceptable levels of risk for residents living in the midst of polluted environments, and
determine the process through which acceptable levels of pollution are achieved.
However, as Giddens, Beck, and many others who use the framework of the “Risk
Society” argue, the notion of risk is more than a scientific calculation (Beck 1992; Beck
2013; Cable, Shriver, and Mix 2008; Ekberg 2007; Giddens 1999; Giddens 2013). Risk
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is also socially constructed and shaped by political-economic context. In Anniston,
acceptable risks were calculated to manage the limitations of the political and
economic moment during which the crisis unfolded.
One of the most important ways risk has been discussed and managed in the
Anniston case is through the large settlement ($700 million) awarded to lawsuit
participants. In addition, the EPA negotiated a Consent Decree with Monsanto/Solutia
for the cleanup, and funds for an education foundation. For a town whose population
hovers around 25,000 people, this may seem comprehensive. However, after
examining how that money was managed and distributed, a lump sum can hardly be
equated with “justice” as defined by activists who set the wider Environmental Justice
movement in motion in the 1990s (Principles of Environmental Justice 1991). The
processes used to determine and administer the outcomes of the Anniston case raise
serious questions about the notions of justice embedded in the legal Environmental
Justice system, and how this system is guided by a neoliberal, econometric logic.
There are disparities between what many litigants hoped for when this case
began and what was delivered in the long run. What caused these disparities? How did
legal and scientific experts guide the construction and implementation of the cleanup
plan? How is environmental governance shaped by the political economy of the US?
This chapter explores these questions through policy and legal perspectives. After a
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brief discussion of methodology, the first empirical section, “A Litigious Landscape,”
details the development of litigation, as one lawsuit after another formed when
residents became aware and activated around the toxicity in their midst.
The next section, “Superfund Alternative: A Policy Choice Driven by Neoliberal
Expertise” examines the rapidly changing political discourse about the Superfund
program and environmental regulation more generally at the time of this case. These
shifts impacted how the cleanup in Anniston was conceived and implemented, giving
corporate actors a roomier seat at the table than would be expected in a traditional
Superfund arrangement. This reflects a deepening neoliberal order, where cuts in state
funding forced the creation of new financial and political arrangements that lowered
barriers for businesses to play a direct role in policymaking.
“Settlement and Distribution” examines the complexity of the process for
claimants to participate in the lawsuits, critiquing the individualization of responsibility
for obtaining the best settlement possible. Because there were multiple lawsuits filed
at different times with different requirements and different law firms, the distribution of
the settlement funds was uneven and confusing. This raises questions about the
decisions imposed on ordinary people who wind up in an impossibly difficult situation.
Reflecting on recent debates regarding reparations, and radically different visions for
what judicial systems could provide, this case highlights inconsistencies, inefficiencies,
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and limitations within liberal, individualized judicial systems, problems which deeply
conflict with the ideals and aspirations of the Environmental Justice Movement.
The final discussion and conclusions section brings these pieces back into
conversation with the 17 principles of Environmental Justice as laid out by activists at
the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit held in 1991.
There is a stark contrast between these activists’ vision of justice and the policies and
procedures documented throughout the rest of the chapter, painting a bleak picture of
the current state of affairs for Environmental Justice policy. This juxtaposition is an
important reminder that such policies, while they may co-opt terms like Environmental
Justice, are strongly shaped by the actors and institutions holding the strongest
political power. At the time of the Anniston case, a corporate-friendly federal
administration lead to a cleanup process that favored an increased collaborative role
with corporate actors. While “collaboration” sounds positive, when the collaborator on
cleanup design is also the polluter, it raises serious concerns about the potential for
corruption and conflicts of interest at the cost of disempowering impacted
communities from meaningful involvement and restitution.

Methods
This chapter emerged from observations of public meetings about the PCB
cleanup in Anniston, Alabama. I regularly attended the semimonthly meetings from
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2013-2016 to understand the cleanup process itself and how its progress was
communicated to the community. The questions guiding this chapter were motivated
by the consistent observation that community members in attendance at these
meetings continued to inquire about accessing settlement funds, gaining assistance for
health problems, and otherwise seeking restitution that, at this point in time, was
largely no longer available. The settlements that were distributed in 2003 (as described
in more detail throughout this chapter) were intended to end all litigation related to the
PCB pollution in the Anniston area.
If that was the case, why did the community continue to raise the question? Why
was it so unclear to so many where all that money went? In addition, attendees at the
meetings also raised consistent concerns about the cleanup. Why did
Monsanto/Solutia play such a large role? The tensions surrounding these latter
questions were especially intense. Nearly every meeting I attended erupted with
contention about the progress and manner of the cleanup. Some questioned the
timeline, which had lagged for years behind what had been promised. Many
questioned the quality of the cleanup, raising concerns about the EPA’s “capping”
methodology and whether simply removing the first two feet of soil in residents’ yards
was sufficient and actually made the polluted region safer.
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This led me to question more deeply how the agreements guiding this cleanup
process came to be. How was this cleanup designed, and who designed it? Why do
these issues remain so contentious, so many years after a formal agreement? Why do
the outcomes of this settlement remain so unclear to so many? Through an exploration
of multiple archival resources, I reconstruct the story of the litigation, the settlement,
and the context in which the cleanup was designed and implemented. I used several
different types of archival data:
1) Newspaper coverage from the local paper of record, The Anniston Star,
dating back to the earliest litigation over PCBs in 1993
2) Newspaper coverage from a national paper of record, The New York Times,
about the shifts in EPA funding, environmental regulation
3) Public comment periods convened by the EPA
4) Chemical industry periodical coverage of the Anniston PCB litigation
5) EPA policy documentation, in particular a report about the Superfund
Alternative Approach (SA)
6) The text of Anniston’s settlements and settlement distribution
documentation
7) Legal analysis of the settlement distribution from academic legal journals
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I chose to use this combination of sources in order to construct a holistic perspective
on the timeline of settlement and cleanup in Anniston- from local to national, from
layperson to expert, from ordinary people to corporate individuals. I organized these
sources into an overlapping timeline, and then coded the data through multiple
“sweeps” – for organization of the timeline, and then again for deeper analysis and
interpretation of events (Waitt 2010, 233).

A Litigious Landscape
In 1993, fish contaminated with Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) were
discovered in Choccolocco Creek, a narrow river that winds through Calhoun,
Talladega, Cleburne, and St. Clair counties in north-central Alabama. Its watershed
impacts the cities of Anniston, Oxford, and Talladega, a mostly rural area with pockets
of rapid development, particularly surrounding I-20. A contractor working in the creek
discovered several deformed fish and informed the Alabama Department of
Environmental Management (ADEM), which completed further testing and found all
but one of the 19 fish they tested surpassed the permissible amount of 2 parts per
million (ppm). “One spotted bass registered more than 38 ppm, or 19 times the limit”
(Reilly 1994a)
Property owners living alongside the water on the southern stretch of the
watershed, including on popular recreation area Logan Martin Lake, sued The
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Monsanto Company in several separate suits, citing declining property values and fear
for their health. One suit was filed by Gordon and Rita Sewell, owners of a fish market
(Reilly 1994b), for whom the problem of contaminated fish was a direct threat to their
livelihood. Some simply wanted someone to take action, as described in the Anniston
Star:
“Standing in the doorway of one of those [Logan Martin Lake] homes, Herbert
Miller – tanned, shorts, no shirt – looked like an advertisement for the waterfront
good life. ‘This water is the only reason we’re down here,’ said Miller, who has
lived 11 years on the creek. ‘If it gets much worse, it’s going to lower the
property values.’ Given that the PCBs might be disperse (sic) everywhere
throughout the creek, however, he wasn’t sure the creek will ever be cleaned up.
‘I don’t know how they could get it out.’ A few docks down, his pessimism was
shared by James McCullars. Formerly of Oxford, McCullars guessed that he
hadn’t eat (sic) a fish from the creek in two or three years. Like a number of his
neighbors, he has signed on to one of the lawsuits currently pending against
Monsanto. As far as any state or federal action, he had heard nothing. ‘I just wish
somebody would do something about it,’ he said” (Reilly 1994b).

As time wore on, awareness of the PCB problem continued to creep closer and
closer to the source of pollution, the Monsanto factory in Anniston. A landfill used by
the company overlooked the West Anniston neighborhood, a working class, largely
black area of the city. In 1995, residents in Sweet Valley – Cobbtown, the
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neighborhood nearest the factory, gathered at the request of ADEM, where they were
asked to submit “their soil, house dust, and even, possibly, their blood” (Pezzullo and
Spencer 1995) for PCB testing. The meeting coincided with Monsanto’s launch of a
home buyout program, an effort to consolidate 40 acres of land surrounding the
contaminated creek. If they lived on contaminated land, residents would be offered the
appraised value of their home, plus a 75 percent premium, and up to $7000 in
miscellaneous and moving expenses. This was the first restitution offer made in the
Choccolocco watershed PCB saga that would continue to unfold until even the writing
of this chapter, over two decades later. However, a response to this first meeting
foreshadowed the upcoming struggle:
“’I grew up in this area and lived off of everyone’s vegetable garden,’ said
[Alberta Freeman] the mother of three, who grew up around the Mars Hill
Church [near which soil had tested for 200,000 ppm PCBs]. ‘With the smell from
the plant I always worried that there was some contamination.’ Thursday’s
meeting didn’t put Ms. Freeman’s mind at ease. ‘I’m leaving here more
concerned than when I came,’ she said” (Pezzullo and Spencer 1995).

Eventually, others would share her concern. For Sharon Cowan, whose 4-yearold daughter died of a rare form of cancer, falling ill soon after moving into her
mother’s West Anniston home, the PCB pollution raised questions about the root
cause of her death. “At a meeting conducted by Alabama Department of Public
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Health…residents were angry and confused at what they view as a cover-up by the
health department and Monsanto. ‘Rich people can get away with anything they want,’
shouted one resident. ‘We have lots of cancer around our neighborhood,’ said another
resident. ‘How do we know that hasn’t caused it’” (Pezzullo 1996a). The buyouts did
not fully assuage these fears. “’What kind of message does it send to these people
when Monsanto is trying to get them off the land, buy up their homes and property?’
asked Anniston attorney Bud Turner, who is representing some of the residents. ‘The
fact is, for folks who live out there, the anxiety and the fear is very real’” (Pezzullo
1996a).
On March 30, 1996, the Anniston Star reported that residents of Sweet ValleyCobbtown were suing Monsanto for $750 million. “One lawsuit seeks $3 million for
each of the 250 plaintiffs who ‘have lived in and around … Monsanto company’s plant
site or have worked or visited the areas around (the plant) on a regular basis for many
years.’ The other seeks $3 million for Thomas Long, a resident of the Sweet Valley
community who registered a high level of PCBs in a blood test.” These suits were in
addition to a $20 million lawsuit filed by Stewart on behalf of Mars Hill Baptist Church
on March 19. In May 1996, Cassandra Roberts organized a meeting of the Sweet Valley
Cobbtown Environmental Justice Task Force, which organized yet another lawsuit of
450 current and former residents of West Anniston. In addition to unspecified
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damages, the suit asked for a full accounting of information regarding pollution so
residents could make an informed decision about whether to stay or leave, as well as
lifelong medical expenses for the impacted populations (Pezzullo 1996c).
Monsanto resisted these claims. “Monsanto denies that it knowingly
contaminated communities around its West Anniston plant and says residents must
take some responsibility for any health hazards they encountered as a result of PCBs
being dumped there…. ‘Plaintiffs did not take reasonable steps available to them to
mitigate the damages alleged to have (been) suffered (emphasis added)…’” (Pezzullo
1996b). The company also called its buyout program “more than fair” (Pezzullo 1996d).
Monsanto also leaned heavily on etiological uncertainty, or the lack of toxological data
tying PCBs directly to deadly illnesses, although the EPA does list the chemical on its
“probable carcinogens” list (“Chemicals Evaluated for Carcinogenic Potential” 2004).
Over time, more and more people were recruited to participate in lawsuits. Meanwhile,
Monsanto spun off its chemical holdings and liabilities to a new company called
Solutia.
The next sections of this chapter compare the expectations of residents as
expressed in the lawsuits described above - which focused on fair restitution, health
compensation and monitoring, and an effective cleanup plan – to the legal and policy
results of their efforts. The following sections analyze two key moments in Anniston’s
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legal history that have not received much attention in previous literature, but have wide
implications for Environmental Justice struggles beyond this context- the decision to
use a Superfund Alternative (SA) approach, and the ways in which the settlement funds
were divided.

Superfund Alternative: A Policy Choice driven by Neoliberal Expertise
EPA officials remediated the Anniston site3 using a Superfund Alternative
Approach (SA), rather than a traditional Superfund arrangement including a listing on
the National Priorities List (NPL). The SA program was created during the Bush
Administration, which defunded the Superfund itself and created a cozier relationship
between the state and corporations in environmental policymaking. As a result,
residents, community groups, and environmental activists raised questions about the
manner in which the EPA designed the Partial Consent Decree (PCD), namely in
meetings with Monsanto/Solutia, the Potentially Responsible Party (PRP). While the
EPA maintained this was nothing out of the ordinary, critics raised the structural
potential for improper collusion between corporate actors and the state. This is an
example of “common-sensification” of neoliberal values throughout many areas of

“Site” refers to the entire impacted area, not just the area within the Anniston city
limits.
3
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state government (Brown 2015); the justice system serves to mitigate the financial and
economic risks posed by places like Anniston, a project distinct from the notions of
justice espoused both by the people of Anniston and by broader Environmental Justice
movement principles.
The intent of the Superfund program, as defined by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), is to
ensure that environmental contamination is cleaned up in a timely manner whether or
not a company steps up to the plate to fund it. The Superfund was once funded mostly
through corporate taxes, but that shifted in 1995 when Superfund taxes expired.
President Clinton tried and failed to push the taxes through Congress, and President
George W. Bush elected not to renew them at all. This had a substantial impact on the
public burden for Superfund:

In 1994, taxpayers paid $250 million for Superfund cleanups, or about 21
percent of the $1.2 billion fund, with corporate taxes paying $950 million, or
about 79 percent. Taxpayers paid $350 million in 1999, and since then have
paid about 50 percent of the cost. Mr. Bush proposes that taxpayers pay $700
million, or more than 50 percent of the $1.3 billion fund, in 2003 (Seelye 2002).
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This shift of tax burden from corporations to individuals reflects neoliberal policies that
reorganize regulatory apparatuses to favor a pro-business, market-driven economic
environment (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2012); in effect, this move also shifts the
financial burden of environmental risk from PRPs to individuals.
One of the impacts of this restructuring was the implementation of the
Superfund Alternative (SA) program as a solution to the reduction in revenue to
replenish the Superfund. Before the introduction of SA, the EPA would independently
execute the cleanup and pay for it using the Superfund trust. Later, after PRPs were
identified, the EPA would sue to replenish the fund under the “polluter pays” principle.
In contrast, in a SA agreement, if a PRP takes responsibility for the pollution and
agrees to pay for the cleanup up front, they sign a consent decree agreement with the
EPA to fund and execute the cleanup according to CERCLA procedures and
regulations. The major difference is an increased involvement of the PRP from the
outset; in a traditional arrangement, the EPA would act independently of a known PRP.
An SA allows for a company to act proactively at the discovery of the pollution and play
an active role in cleaning up the site. One of the issues with this, however, is the
potential for a conflict of interest; should a company that actively played a role in
creating a major pollution event have such a large role in designing and implementing
the cleanup? While the EPA’s internal review of SA “found no obvious trends that
82

distinguished SA sites from NPL sites” and “the general response to SA [was] positive”
(Superfund Alternative Approach Baseline Assessment April 2011), the program has
been the subject of criticism from environmental groups (“House Panel Seeks Review
of ‘Alternative’ Cleanup Approach” 2009).
In Anniston, the implementation of this program was marked with significant
skepticism among community activists involved in the case. There were several reasons
for this. One, the EPA met with Monsanto/Solutia independently from the people of
Anniston or other potential stakeholders to craft the consent decree. As a result, the
Consent Decree came unexpectedly (Bluemink March 21, 2002). While this is
consistent with EPA procedures once a PRP is identified, the deal raised concerns
about the coziness between the EPA and corporate actors, and the role of corporate
actors in conducting their own cleanup. “Plaintiffs’ attorneys have accused the EPA of
‘letting the fox out of the henhouse’ by allowing the companies to perform the
investigations” (Bluemink 2002).
This reflects the state’s reliance on expert-driven, top-down decision-making for
Environmental Justice (Fischer 2000) by restricting significant community input or
participation in shaping the terms of the agreement (Bluemink 2002). This stands in
contrast with notions of justice that scholars have identified in the broader
Environmental Justice movement. The Environmental Justice movement’s vision of
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justice advocates “increasing participatory parity, so that all individuals and groups are
able to participate as peers in environmental decision making, scientific research, and
regulatory agenda setting” (Harrison 2014).
Two, the consent decree did not include long term health studies or
compensation. Instead, it created an education fund for children with learning
disabilities.
“Plaintiffs’ attorneys have described the EPA consent decree as insufficient to
meet the needs of their clients, who have PCBs in their property and their blood.
In the lawsuit, they ask [Judge] Laird to require Solutia to pay for medical
monitoring for people in the Anniston area who were exposed to PCBs, and
they ask for PCB removals in waterways, landfills, and other contaminated areas.
Anniston officials also have complained that the $3.2 million provided in the
consent decree for special education programs in Anniston is not a meaningful
sum” (Bluemink 2002).

Therefore, not only were impacted community members divorced from the
consent decree negotiations, their demands were not honored, further increasing the
grounds for suspicion of corporate actors’ involvement.
In contrast, the EPA was publicly very proud of this agreement, even though it
did not reflect popular demands. While EPA official Annie Godfrey stated, “I feel that
this is one of the best consent decrees we’ve ever had,” and EPA assistant regional
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attorney Dustin Minor stated, “We shot for the moon” (Bluemink 2002), the EPA
nonetheless neglected to include the healthcare demands sought by Anniston
residents in the negotiations. The lack of a public comment period for SA negotiations
indicates that this process is designed to limit public input from the outset, while giving
those responsible for the pollution itself a privileged seat in the cleanup negotiation
process. This reproduces an unequal power dynamic between the state, corporations,
and ordinary people mired in this conflict.
Three, the consent decree was agreed upon while litigation was being tried in
court. The lawsuits may have put ADEM in charge of the cleanup of public areas and
dump sites. After the consent decree was entered, Monsanto/Solutia filed a motion for
the court to dismiss the state’s cleanup as part of the litigation, saying that the Consent
Decree covered that need. This indicates a tension between environmental
policymaking and enforcement bodies operating at different scales.
However, the decision against listing the site on the NPL resonated positively
with some commentators in the wider Anniston area. Many in the city were worried
about a potential “stigma” surrounding a Superfund designation. An editorial in the
Anniston Star stated:
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“…a lot of people have an aversion to Superfund and being designated a
Superfund site. That’s totally understandable. If your community is designated
Superfund, you can get some powerful help from the federal officials, but the
label it gives you isn’t something to brag about. ‘Hi, I’m from Anniston, Ala.,
home to the nation’s most recent Superfund site’ isn’t a line that would go over
too well at a cocktail party much less an industrial recruiting trip” (Fleming
2002).

This concern for Anniston’s perception among others connects the notion of
“Superfund Stigma” to a need for municipalities to be competitive in bids for
(re)development. Anniston must not only have a basic infrastructure to support
businesses, but it also must be a desirable place. An NPL list may negatively impact its
public visibility as a place for doing business; Anniston, as a place in itself, is subsumed
in market logic at a moment when a citizen-centric logic seems especially appropriate.
This again signals the power of the neoliberal logic dominating this moment in time
and space: “…as the legitimacy and task of the state becomes bound exclusively to
economic growth, global competitiveness, and maintenance of a strong credit rating,
liberal democratic justice concerns recede” (Brown 2016, 40).
An EPA report about SA also mentions this “stigma,” noting concerns about
future redevelopment in places on the NPL and concerns about companies’ ability to
be bought and sold if a NPL site is listed in its liabilities (GAO 13-252 2013). While
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Solutia claimed that “it’s going to get everything done in an expedited manner,”
(Bluemink 2002a), the Anniston PCB site cleanup remains incomplete, confirming the
EPA’s own assessment that the SA program does not result in shorter cleanup times.
Throughout the debates about the institution of the SA program, there was an
assumption that a cleanup designed in cooperation with PRPs would result in a faster,
more comprehensive cleanup. This assumes that private corporate involvement would
be better, a key guiding tenet of neoliberal policy reforms (Peck, Theodore, Brenner
2012). The profit motivation that drives companies is thought to be enough to
encourage expeditious environmental recoveries; however, the Anniston case suggests
that the assumption of expeditiousness was unfulfilled.
In the eyes of the state, the Anniston case was not so much an injustice – which
connotes a sense of outrage – but more a problem to be managed. It was a pollution
incident that had to be taken care of and paid for with some expediency because of an
outraged and active impacted-population. Transparency and community input were
sacrificed in service to that goal as the SA arrangement expedited the construction of
an unexpected consent decree. Embedded within this arrangement, too, was the
assumption that private management of the cleanup would be better—no need to sue
later, and the cleanup could happen much faster with a stable funding stream.
However, this assumption of the superiority of the market-driven motive for
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environmental responsibility has proven deeply questionable in the long-run, as the
cleanup drags on and tensions with the community continue to mark the cleanup
proceedings to this day. While some of these tensions stem from the decision to use
SA and not to be listed on the NPL, other people remain embittered by the decision to
settle with Monsanto and the way in which the settlements were distributed.

Settlement and Distribution
This section analyzes the legal settlement and distribution of funds for the nearly
20,000 plaintiffs who eventually participated in the suits. There was a lack of
centralized, coordinated response to the PCB pollution as the crisis unfolded for the
population of the Choccolocco watershed. Relatively small groups of individuals filed
multiple lawsuits with different requirements for participation and expectations of
restitution. It was often unclear which state agencies to call on for assistance, and, in
the buyout program, Monsanto functioned as an environmental agency in a preemptive attempt to avoid the litigation that ensued. The EPA did not become involved
until 1998. In spite of residents’ and activists’ agitation for greater recognition of the
qualitative concerns surrounding health and safety, many were met with an
individualized, quantitative logic. The choice of where one lived, which lawsuit one
joined, whether one got a blood test – those were the choices that determined one’s
settlement. In contrast, Monsanto never had to admit fault for the choice it made to
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pollute. Instead, it was positioned to impose a series of choices upon a population who
never asked to be a part of this conflict in the first place. This devolution of
responsibility away from a centralized state and toward the individual (Herbert 2005) is
one of the key tenets of neoliberal logic. However, as Herbert argues, this devolution
actually delegitimizes the work of the state because of the negative impacts it has for
ordinary people. The fallout from the settlements is a root cause of the caustic tension
in ongoing meetings about the cleanup, and a consistent source of the distrust held by
community members toward the state.
The legal literature notes that there is a great deal of pressure to settle out of
court: "Since the court dockets are overflowing with lawsuits, all else equal, litigants
should be encouraged to resolve their disputes privately through out-of-court
settlement" (Spier 1994, 84). The vast majority of all cases do settle, in part because
the incentive to settle is high when compared with the cost of going to court. The
decision is most often framed as an economic one: "When two litigants resolve a
dispute through out-of-court settlement rather than trial, they realize joint gains of
trade equal to the sum of the costs both parties would have incurred had they
obtained a trial judgment minus the costs they incur reaching settlement" (Korobkin
and Guthrie 1994, 1). While the pressure to settle is real, I argue that it forces parties to
overlook the qualitative characteristics of claims for Environmental Justice in favor of
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econometric considerations of time and money, resonating with Brown’s observation of
the evolution of justice in the neoliberal state: “justice, peace, or environmental
sustainability may be pursued to the extent that they advance economic purposes”
(Brown 2016, 40). The design and implementation of this settlement is a painful
exhibition of the way litigants in this case experienced this logic in practice.
In 2003, the judge overseeing the Anniston lawsuits—at that time largely
consolidated into two mass action suits (Abernathy v. Monsanto and Tolbert v.
Monsanto)—strongly encouraged the litigants to settle, as Solutia threatened
bankruptcy. In the archives, it is constantly mentioned how lengthy, complex, and
wide-ranging this case was for everyone involved:
“At the outset, [Judge] Laird said he wanted to expedite the hearings, and
perhaps the PCB cleanup itself…However, the hearings have been plagued with
‘stops and starts,’ attorneys said. In spite of the delays, the acrimony and Solutia
attorneys’ regular objections to Laird rulings, a certain boot-camp atmosphere
has pervaded the hearings. Some of them have lasted almost to midnight and
involved hours of testimony on PCB data collection and the multi-regulatory
actions at the site since 1993” (Bluemink 2002c).

When the time came to settle,
"The two judges had proven instrumental in bringing both sets of cases—state
and federal—to a simultaneous conclusion. 'Ordinarily, federal and state courts
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don't interact,' Judge Clemon said later. But the companies were not going to
settle unless the parties could resolve all of the cases pending in federal and
state court....Overhanging the state cases was the prospect that the
conservative Alabama Supreme Court might overturn all the verdicts hammered
out in Laird's court. When the landmark accord was announced in Judge
Clemon's Birmingham courtroom, all of the lawyers rose to acknowledge the
judges, with a standing ovation" (Spears 2014, 263).

In Anniston, the issues that were considered allowable in court were significantly
whittled down from the residents' original major concerns. When the PCB problem first
became public, health issues were consistently the most frightening and pervasive
issue for residents in the city. However, as a result of the legal process, health issues
were largely ruled out as potential liabilities for Monsanto/Solutia. According to articles
published by the International Chemical Information Service (ICIS), a market research
provider for industry professionals, ruling these out was a key concern and goal for the
defendants.

Solutia has said there is ‘no consistent, convincing evidence that PCBs are
associated with serious, long-term health effects’ (Johnson 2002).

‘Medical monitoring is not appropriate for PCB exposure anyway,’ says Peck,
one of the attorneys who will argue the case for Solutia. ‘The overwhelming
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weight of scientific evidence suggests there are no chronic human health effects
associated with exposure to PCBs’ (Sissell 2000).

In these examples, health issues were an obstacle that Monsanto fought.
Lawyers relied on scientific uncertainty regarding the direct toxic impacts of PCBs in
order to argue, and eventually win in court, that health claims could only be considered
if the patient was currently ill and could tie that illness directly to the PCB
contamination (Sauer 2002). Therefore, even though many people had PCB levels in
their bloodstream that were tens of times higher than was allowed by the standards set
forth by the Centers for Disease Control (Spears 2014), the fear of the impacts of PCB
content in their blood was not enough to win compensation because the court agreed
that claims citing “fear of future illness” could not be included, a boon to the
defendants. Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs were currently ill, and suspected that
PCBs were the cause, unless there was a toxicological study providing scientific proof
that their condition was tied to PCB contamination, then they could not prove that their
illness was not caused by some external factor, in spite of the widespread belief among
scientists that PCBs are wholly carcinogenic (Spears 2014). Due to the ban of PCBs,
conducting a new toxological study was extremely unlikely.
Herbert’s (2005) notion of the “trapdoor of community” contends that neoliberal
devolution of state responsibilities to the community level results in communities losing
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confidence in the state. While the context here is quite different than Herbert’s
argument, the notion of neoliberal logic acting as the “trap door” for collective social
burdens stands: the state devolves the responsibility here for proving the harm of PCBs
on individual claimants. Through no fault of the claimants (for who could have known
there would be such a great need for PCB toxicological studies?), people were
burdened with proving the desperation of their situation, rather than the state
recognizing the clear imposition of a collective burden by a corporate actor.
What happened after the settlement was reached constitutes one of the most
contentious pieces in any legal drama: the struggle over money. The cases were
agglomerated into two main groups: Abernathy v. Monsanto and Tolbert v. Monsanto.
Abernathy claimants, of whom there were roughly 3,500, were some of the earliest to
enter into litigation once the PCB drama made its way back up the river to Anniston
from Logan Martin Lake. Tolbert claimants began signing up in 2001, when community
groups helped organize a second case to ensure that everyone who wanted to attempt
restitution could participate. The participation in this case ballooned when celebrity
lawyer Johnny Cochran came to Anniston to recruit clients, and at the time of the
settlement, 18,447 claimants were represented (Kitchens 2004).
Herein lies the rub: the settlement was divided evenly between the two groups.
Each group of lawyers were also compensated the same amount - $120 million in each
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case. The remaining amounts were split among the plaintiffs based on a combination
of factors including property damage, time living in the area, and the amount of PCBs
in their blood. The Abernathy claimants’ average payout was $49,000. The average
payout for Cochran’s clients was under $9,000.
The decisions people made about which case to sign up for represent an
individualization of the responsibility for determining restitution. An example in a
Forbes article on the settlement distribution highlighted the peculiarity of this problem:
“Cynthia Tucker, 46, and her older sister, Julia Oliver, grew up in the same house,
located 2 miles away from the Monsanto plant. But Julia was a Stewart [Abernathy]
client, and she was, Cynthia says, ‘paid handsomely.’ Cynthia, on the other hand, is a
federal [Tolbert] plaintiff and is still waiting for money” (Kitchens 2004).
There are few public details available about how the Abernathy settlement was
distributed, aside from what was reported in the press:

“[Judge] Laird gave Stewart [the lawyer] sole discretion in allocating cash,
except for payouts to children and some estates. Rather than devising a
payment matrix on his own, Stewart says he relied on a statistical analysis
company in New York to decide on levels of compensation, based on earlier jury
awards. He insists that he is happy with the settlement and most of his clients
are, too. But some claimants, such as Reverend Thomas Long, say they aren’t
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sure how Stewart came up with the compensation amounts that he did. ‘There is
no accountability here,’ he says” (Kitchens 2004).

In a letter addressed to Tolbert claimants who complained about the diminutive
size of their settlements in comparison, lawyers explain the disparity in further detail
(see Figure 5).
In the Abernathy case, the letter pictured in Figure 5 states that most of the
claimants lived near the factory, which is a working class, largely black neighborhood.
In early newspaper coverage, legal teams and local health authorities talked about
blood testing, encouraging residents to participate. Qualitative evidence suggests
once again a low income level for these claimants: “‘I don’t have time to get to the
post office [to get test results],’ said Juell Jackson, a Cobb Town resident who works
the night shift at Tyson Foods. ‘I get home from work in the mornings and have enough
time to take a bath and go to bed’” (Pezzullo 1996e). Additionally, after the
settlements were divided, the caretakers of the Abernathy settlement fund were sued
by the United States government to recover Medicare payments; the suit alleged that
907 of the 3,500 claimants were Medicare beneficiaries (“Medicare Flexes Its Muscles”
2010).
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Figure 5 Letter to Tolbert claimants.
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It is possible that many of the people most acutely exposed and impacted by
the pollution did receive a comparatively more significant settlement than those who
participated in the Tolbert case, which encompassed a much wider range of people.
However, the original lawsuits sought roughly $3 million in restitution for each
individual claimant, hardly close to the average $49,000 award per claimant reported.
In contrast, the Tolbert suit represented an astoundingly wide range of people.
“Of the 18,000 claimants in the Tolbert case, about 14,000 lived in Alabama, mostly in
the Anniston area, but 4,000 lived in forty-four other states and overseas. Two hundred
were in prison and one hundred were located in foreign countries. Three hundred were
deceased when Tolbert settled” (Gentle 2008, 1251). Edgar C. Gentle, III was
appointed as the claims administrator for the suit, and he describes the process to
distribute the funds as “Design by Collaboration” (Gentle 2008, 1256). The legal team
held meetings in Anniston to construct a formula where residents’ settlements were
calculated, including the amount of PCBs in the claimants’ blood stream, personal
property damage and time spent living in the Anniston area. After all expenses,
including $25 million set aside for a health clinic, the average settlement amount was
$7726.63 (Gentle 2008).
During the Abernathy trial, Monsanto tried to have Judge Laird recused from
the case, citing bias against them in the courtroom. The Supreme Court of Alabama
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denied their claim, but the following passage quoted helps contextualize the overall
candor of some discussions in the courtroom. The passage begins with Judge Laird
discussing Monsanto’s legal responsibility for property values before and after the
pollution:
The Court [Judge Laird]: There again, if you are looking at it-If the jury comes

back with an award—say the difference between before and after the fair market
value is $50,000, and they come back and give a plaintiff $50,000, but yet it
costs $100,000 to clean it up, then the plaintiff still can’t clean it up. And there is
still a continuousMr. Prater [Monsanto Lawyer]: Perhaps, your honor, that plaintiff[s] may have to

elect that remedy; although, I still think the law is clear in Alabama that they are
not entitled in a property-damage case to get more than the value of the
property before and after. That law is 200 years old in this state.
Mr. Stewart [Plaintiffs’ lawyer]: Of course, that law doesn’t contemplate what

happened in this instance, judge.
The Court: Well, a person’s home is his castle, right.
Mr. Prater: Yes, sir.
The Court: I wonder what the king would think if his property was contaminated.

I really wonder what the president of Monsanto would think if his property was
contaminated and it was worth less than-it had a negative value, was going to
cost twice as much to clean it up as it was worth, and his wife didn’t want to
leave that castle. What do you think the king would do when the queen didn’t
want to leave?
Mr. Prater: One of those things we are going to persuade you, your Honor.
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Mr. Peck [Monsanto lawyer]: Your Honor, aside from the legal point that –
The Court: I’m ready to go.
Mr. Peck: Ok. There is also a foundational problem.
The Court: I’m past ready to go.
Mr. Peck: Ok. Got it” (Supreme Court of Alabama).

The Judge’s admonition to Monsanto – what would Monsanto do if their property were
contaminated and the settlement offer was not economically sufficient –slides right off
the Monsanto lawyers’ back. While Monsanto complained of a bristly atmosphere for
them in an unsympathetic courtroom, their defense cites laws that protect their ability
to restrict the amount awarded for property damages to the value of the home before
and after. While the judge’s pithy parable is not legally binding, it attempts to
communicate a moral message about Monsanto’s responsibility that the company does
not accept, nor does it have to. A legal system dominated by econometric logic is
unable to grapple with the more qualitative questions of morality, with the place-based
complexities that shape environmental conflicts. “The replacement of citizenship
defined as concern with the public good by citizenship reduced to the citizen as homo
oeconomicus also eliminates the very idea of a people, a demos asserting its collective
political sovereignty” (Brown 2016, 39). In the following conclusion, I argue this
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abandonment of the collective in favor of the individual has much deeper implications
for fulfilling the ideals and goals of the broader Environmental Justice movement.

Conclusion
In 1991, the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit
was held in Washington, DC. The attendees drafted and adopted a list of 17 principles
of Environmental Justice, with the following text as an introduction:

“We, the people of color gathered at this multinational People of Color
Environmental Leadership Summit, to begin to build a national and international
movement of all peoples of color to fight the destruction and taking of our lands
and communities, do hereby re-establish our spiritual interdependence to the
sacredness of our Mother Earth; to ensure Environmental Justice; to promote
economic alternatives which would contribute to the development of
environmentally safe livelihoods; and, to secure our political, economic, and
cultural liberation that has been denied for over 500 years of colonization and
oppression, resulting in the poisoning of our communities and land and the
genocide of our peoples, do affirm and adopt these Principles of Environmental
Justice” (Environmental Justice Network 1991).

The demands here cut deeply to the origins of modernity on the American
continent. Environmental Justice is connected to justice for a longer settler colonial
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project that destroyed people and land, and calls for a radical recognition of the value
of human life and the environment. Just five years after this proclamation, in 1996,
President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations. The
following excerpt captures the strategic goals for the order:
“1–103. Development of Agency Strategies. (a) Except as provided in section 6–
605 of this order, each Federal agency shall develop an agency-wide
Environmental Justice strategy, as set forth in subsections (b)–(e) of this section
that identifies and addresses disproportionately high and adverse human health
or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations. The Environmental Justice strategy
shall list programs, policies, planning and public participation processes,
enforcement, and/or rulemakings related to human health or the environment
that should be revised to, at a minimum: (1) promote enforcement of all health
and environmental statutes in areas with minority populations and low-income
populations; (2) ensure greater public participation; (3) improve research and
data collection relating to the health of and environment of minority populations
and low-income populations; and (4) identify differential patterns of
consumption of natural resources among minority populations and low-income
populations. In addition, the Environmental Justice strategy shall include, where
appropriate, a timetable for undertaking identified revisions and consideration
of economic and social implications of the revisions.”
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I present these documents in conjunction with each other not for comparative
purposes; they are almost incomparable except to say the demands placed on
government agencies by President Clinton were hardly as revolutionary as the first
document’s ideals. Rather, this juxtaposition is presented to stir reflection on the ways
in which activist ideals are significantly filtered by the time they make their way into
public policy. These are both Environmental Justice documents, but they are almost
unrecognizable from one another in terms of their substantive content. The Clinton
order is marked by a series of measurable outcomes- enforcement of statutes, ensuring
public participation, collect more data, and so on. How does one measure the
demands sought by the Environmental Justice activists in the previous statement –
social and cultural liberation? Perhaps what is called for is actually a new form of system
entirely, one not dependent on quantitative measurement of property and loss, but
instead on redefining relationships, and restructuring power dynamics.
In a similar way, the Anniston case demonstrates how the expectations people in
Anniston held for the justice system were filtered by the structural conditions of
environmental policymaking as well as the individualized liberal logic that governs the
US justice system. Structurally, the manner in which Anniston’s case was managed was
strongly shaped by the current moment of neoliberal devolution of responsibility for
environmental regulation. The Bush Administration’s refusal to reinstitute the
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Superfund Tax resulted in the creation of the SA arrangement structure, that gave PRPs
a stronger voice in the cleanup design and implementation. On the local level, while
some feared a conflict of interest as the corporation held responsible for the pollution
was also the entity handling the cleanup, others feared more the implications if
Anniston were to be placed on the NPL. Some were convinced the city could not “sell”
itself in the future with the “stigma” attached on the NPL. Meanwhile, this fear of urban
un-competitiveness played into the hands of corporate entities who also stood to
benefit, as the Superfund “stigma” could look problematic on a company’s liabilities
balance sheet.
Additionally, the dispensation of settlement dollars had at least as much to do
with one’s individual choices as it did with the injuries one actually experienced. Which
case one signed up for at what point in time, where one chose to live, whether one
owned property or not—these factors reduced the collective trauma of pollution to its
constituent measurable parts. The high burden of proof for health claims—the illness
must be current, and directly tied to toxicological data that proves it was caused by
PCBs—made it possible for Monsanto to exclude health claims from the settlement,
except for Tolbert claimants willing to take a blood test. The individualized burden of
proof for health claims from victims demonstrates the uneven power relationships
embedded in this arrangement; those who have been harmed must prove the harm.
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These decisions and tensions surrounding SA and the distribution of settlements
in Environmental Justice suits beg for more investigation. There is a regional pattern to
SA agreements, in EPA regions 3 (Southeast) and 5 (Midwest/Rust Belt). More research
would help determine any broader political and economic trends driving this pattern.
On a very general level, more investigation is needed about what actually happens
when settlements are dispersed in Environmental Justice cases. There is very little
documentation in the literature of the ways in which the awards are distributed and
whether the settlements actually resolved issues in the long run. This research, then,
contributes new knowledge to Environmental Justice literatures by extending the
narrative beyond the pinnacle of a trial and investigating the long-term implications of
the justice system’s methods for achieving justice.
This is especially important because there seems to be no end in sight for
Environmental Justice conflicts in the United States. Scholars must look backwards in
time with a critical eye at both what Environmental Justice activism, research, and legal
progress has achieved and also what it has not been able to accomplish. While the
notion of “justice” is contested and takes many forms, if the project of the
Environmental Justice movement is to achieve justice for those who have experienced
the brunt of modernity, then cases like Anniston’s teach us that Environmental Justice
remains an unfinished, deeply imperfect project, particularly if it continues to rely
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uncritically on engagement with the state (Pulido et al 2016). Future research needs to
continue documenting the results of engaging with the state to achieve Environmental
Justice in order to fully understand the challenges communities like Anniston may face
in achieving a collectively effective and grassroots-empowering resolution for
environmental conflicts.
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CHAPTER 5
REMEDIATING A SENSE OF PLACE: MEMORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE IN ANNISTON, ALABAMA
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Abstract
Anniston, Alabama is home to an ongoing struggle for Environmental Justice as
residents remain embroiled in a remediation process to clean up PCB pollution left by
The Monsanto Company. This paper engages with literature in Black Geographies,
public memory, and Environmental Justice to argue that remedial processes neglect
senses of place that are valued by impacted communities. In West Anniston, the
predominantly black neighborhood that bore the brunt of the pollution, the
remediation’s failure to restore a sense of place contributes to an ongoing erasure of
black life from the landscape. As a result, the remediation transforms from a relatively
benign project to one that facilitates a violence of forgetting. This paper examines how
black life is remembered, commemorated, and valued by residents who participate in
the remedial process.

Introduction
“The material landscape itself, as it is produced by the black subject and
mapped as unimaginably black, must be rewritten into black, and arguably
human, existence on different terms…. invisible geographies, marginality,
indicate a struggle, and ways of knowing the world, which can also illustrate
wider conceptual and material spaces for consideration: real, lived
dispossessions and reclamations, for example. The margins and invisibility, then,
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are also lived and right in the middle of our historically present landscape.”
Katherine McKittrick, Demonic Grounds – pp. 5- 7

From 1935 to 1997, Monsanto operated an industrial chemical factory in
Anniston, Alabama, a small city nestled in a picturesque area in the southernmost tip of
the Appalachian Mountains. Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), manufactured at the
facility from 1929 (before Monsanto by the Swann Chemical Company) to 1971, were a
key component of its best-selling product, Aroclors, an industrial-grade insulant that
was commonly used in electrical transformer boxes (Spears 2014). Throughout their
manufacture, Monsanto routinely dumped PCBs into a landfill or directly into the
nearest streams. Today, although the chemical was banned by the US government in
1979 due to concerns over its toxicity, many parts of the town and surrounding area
remain contaminated, earning the city the unfortunate designation as the “Toxic City”
(Tutor 2016).
Anniston residents are routinely cited in EPA documentation as having the
highest levels of PCBs in their blood of any known population (“Anniston- PCBs and
Dioxins/furans in Soil, Blood, and Air and Pesticides in Soil” 1999). PCBs are widely
known to cause health problems, and are included on the EPA's "probable
carcinogens" list (Cogliano 1998). The dangers of PCBs have been documented almost
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since the very start of their manufacture, when workers reported developing a skin
condition called chloracne, a reaction where large, painful open sores would emerge
and linger after direct contact with the substance. Monsanto workers in Anniston would
also complain of headaches, nosebleeds, and would fall ill with strange cancers and
illnesses of the liver and major organs. Before long, residents were complaining of the
same kinds of conditions, and records kept by local residents indicate that people
living near the factory in the predominantly black West Anniston neighborhood were
routinely exposed to PCBs and frequently died from strange illnesses that no one could
medically explain (Grunwald 2002, Spears 2014).
The issue takes on greater significance considering most pollution occurred
during the state’s enforcement of Jim Crow segregation laws that kept black people in
neighborhoods with poisoned soil, water, and air. This segregation, which persists in
contemporary settlement patterns, ensured that vulnerable and marginal populations
were routinely exposed to the most dangerous environmental conditions in the city.
While there is evidence that the state of Alabama was aware of the pollution and
its dangers for many decades (Shelby 2002), it was not until Monsanto began quietly
buying up and razing properties as part of a buyout program in Anniston in the 1990s
that the pollution became more widely known to the general public. Community
leaders and residents from areas most affected by the pollution—particularly in the
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West Anniston neighborhood—formed a group called Community Against Pollution
(CAP) to organize against Monsanto's negligence and fight for the neighborhood,
which was being rapidly decimated by the property buyouts (Spears 2014). Eventually,
this group joined with others in the region to sue Monsanto, which eventually resulted
in a $700 million settlement divided among tens of thousands of plaintiffs, and the
implementation of a consent decree, which included the founding of the CAG. This
research picks up Anniston’s story roughly at this point in time, examining the
implementation and impacts of the remediation in the city.
On September 23, 2013, people in Anniston gathered at the Carver Community
Center in the West Anniston neighborhood. The CAG gathered around several folding
tables positioned in a U-shape in front of a small audience. One at a time, a
representative from the EPA, a corporate representative, and a technical advisor gave
presentations about the progress of the PCB cleanup, now over a decade in progress.
These meetings were often very tense as residents and experts would openly spar over
the details of the cleanup. Over the next three years of attending these meetings and
reconstructing Anniston’s cleanup process in the archives, the author observed that
community participants would use a “Band-Aid” analogy frequently to describe a
pervasive sense of dissatisfaction with the outcomes of a long-term struggle for justice
in the wake of environmental violence. While many residents of Anniston share pieces
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of $700 million in restitution awarded from litigation, including cleanup costs, a health
clinic, and individual payouts determined by property damage and amounts of PCBs
detected in residents’ bloodstreams, many people remain concerned about the state
of the city over the long term and call into question the adequacy of the EPA’s
remediation procedures.
The buildings that remain intact in Anniston, particularly West Anniston, which
was most acutely impacted by the pollution, are surrounded by vacant lots, dilapidated
homes, closed schools, and abandoned industrial sites. While the remedial process has
been largely completed for residential areas in Anniston, save for several places where
the EPA has not been granted access by the owners, people who attend meetings
about the cleanup frequently invoke the state of the West Anniston neighborhood as a
persistent source of pain because of the memory of what this neighborhood once wasa black neighborhood with a strong sense of community.
Scientific environmental remediation is not designed to reconcile this memory
with the present state of the city; it has a very specific mandate to achieve acceptable
levels of pollution risk for the soil, water, and air. However, residents’ use of memories
of this neighborhood invoke a vision of West Anniston with which the remediation is
not designed to engage. I argue this is a missed opportunity to engage with a deeper
notion of Environmental Justice that people express through place. The state’s failure
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to take seriously the memories and sense of place expressed throughout the cleanup
process in Anniston becomes another layer of injustice in a long history of violence
toward black life.
While environmental remediation may be able to repair the soil, water, and air,
could it also be possible to remediate another piece of what’s lost in what Nixon (2011)
would call the slow violence of environmental disasters: a “sense of place”? This paper
argues that environmental remediation conducted by the EPA in its current form, even
while well-intended, contributes to an ongoing systematic devaluation and erasure of
black life in the landscape because it does not take seriously the qualitative
connections people have to “place.” The pollution itself is invisible in the city’s
contemporary landscape; one cannot readily see PCBs, or lead, another widespread
contaminant throughout the neighborhood. But, seeing through the lens of what West
Anniston once was, the pollution scarred more than the physical geography of the city;
it ruptured the city’s sense of place. While residents express a desire for Anniston to be
made “whole” again, this cannot happen without communities having a valued place
for memory in the remediation.
This paper highlights ways in which residents expressed qualitative
characteristics of West Anniston’s sense of place throughout various stages of the
remedial process. In particular, residents’ use of memory to critique the impacts of
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remediation accomplishes two things: 1) it challenges the boundaries of what
remediation is designed to accomplish, and 2) invokes a little-recognized memorial
geography of black life. The remediation’s failure (by accident or design) to value the
ongoing “memory-work” (Houston 2012, Till 2012) happening in the process to clean
up the city implicates it as a participant in an ongoing erasure of black life, one layered
among the already devastating erasures wrought by the pollution, and the devastation
wrought by the impacts of deindustrialization in this working class city. It represents an
active neglect of what people value about place at the very moment that one could
reasonably hope some sense of place to be restored.
This paper brings scholarship about black life, memory, and the environment
into conversation with one another and with the mundane reality of environmental
remediation in practice. Not intended to be read as a wholesale indictment of statedriven remediation, instead this work makes a case for encouraging a greater synthesis
between physical environmental remediation and the human values that are also
impacted by environmental injustice. By integrating the ways impacted communities
express what is valued about place, in this case through memory, remedial projects
could make much greater progress in making places feel “whole” again after traumatic
incidents of environmental and racial violence.
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Literature Review
Environmental Justice scholars are increasingly taking up the role of memory in
communities’ struggles against environmental violence. Geographers have long shown
interest in memorial landscapes and formalized memorial projects, and have
contributed to understanding the relationship between memory, geography, and
power. Memorial projects often reflect the power structures and regimes that created
them (Azaryahu and Foote 2007), communicating selectively about historical events,
figures, and valued identity characteristics (Till 2005). This has resulted in significant,
powerful biases in the public memory of events and people throughout the world that
influence the lens through which the public is able to interpret modern social issues.
In part, this can explain why Black Geographies are absent or marginalized; a lack of
formal recognition and power leads to a lack of formal memorial geography of
marginalized populations and events (Nieves 2007, 85). As a result, decisions regarding
which events should be remembered publicly through concrete acts such as
commemoration and memorialization often remain in the hands of those with enough
resources, influence, and institutional connections to ensure the survival of those
memories (Dwyer 2000). This can result in "historical amnesia" (Azaryahu and Foote
2007, 129), where events unimportant to the narratives espoused by the powerful are
omitted and forgotten. As Dwyer and Alderman (2008, 168) note, "...the social process
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of remembering is accompanied, simultaneously, by a process of forgetting—an
excluding of other historical narratives from public consideration and recognition." In
Anniston, changes wrought in the landscape by pollution and remediation have begun
this process of forgetting—without a formal recognition of the lives and communities
that made up that landscape, the knowledge and memory of an entire community
stands to be lost.
However, memory is not always so destructive. There are ways in which memory
is used as a tool for achieving social and Environmental Justice and producing counternarratives. It can “serve as a bulwark against the erasure, neglect, or elision of a
memory as a potential source and opportunity for history” (Hanchard 2008, 52). Recent
literature in Environmental Justice explores how people use personal and collective
expressions of memory to bring alternative environmental and social visions to public
life (Houston 2012, Vasudevan 2012). “The tasks of witnessing, storytelling, and
memory work create a space through which the unimaginable of environmental
pollution and unequal environmental protection can be expressed…storytelling
provides a framework for understanding how multiple realities of environmental injury
come together in ways that are not always readily discernible through policy or
scientific practice” (Houston 2012, 419). A common problem with environmental policy
and enforcement is that it does not necessarily attempt to reconcile what communities
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value about places, while it takes great efforts to remediate the physical injuries of the
landscape.
Memory is a tool through which impacted communities and individuals can
articulate this disconnect. In Pavithra Vasudevan’s account of making a film called
“Remembering Kearneytown,” about a foundational case of environmental injustice in
Warren County, North Carolina, she writes, “it may seem, from outsider accounts and
mainstream narratives of Environmental Justice, that the remediation of the landfill
brought closure to residents of Warren County. Yet…the story has not ended”
(Vasudevan 2012, 22). Vasudevan writes of how the widespread notoriety surrounding
Warren County’s story created the assumption among outsiders that justice was
achieved.
However, locally, residents continue to face “substantive challenges that
constrain citizens from having effects” (Pezzullo 2001, 3). Vasudevan contextualizes her
use of filmmaking as “an attempt at using performance as research to enable proximity
where distance has failed to do justice, an effort to re-root the story of Environmental
Justice in the bodies and landscapes of Warren County” (Vasudevan 2012, 22).
Karen Till's notion of wounded cities offers another way to understand how
memory is used by actors who are not creating formalized memorial projects. She
argues that places which have undergone mass violence and histories of displacement
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are active centers for "memory work" around those issues. "When places are physically
demolished, not only is the stability of the taken-for-granted rhythms destroyed, an
individual's personal and intrasubjective emotional ecosystems become damaged (root
shock)" (Till 2012, 10). As a result, people attempt to create healing places in the wake
of such damage through artistic and activist work to maintain emotional connections to
those places, and to articulate alternative political visions. "Materially, memory-work
motivates the creation of social capital, provides a range of memorialization activities,
creates new forms of public memory, and is committed to intergenerational education
and social outreach" (Till 2012, 7).
In addition, taking note of how the state uses erasure can be instructive for
understanding another layer of the power relationships embedded in struggles for
Environmental Justice. In Anniston, the lack of recognition of the memories community
members articulate throughout the cleanup process works to facilitate an erasure of
black life. Community uses of memory can give scholars and activists fresh demands in
the Environmental Justice movement. Learning to integrate the ways black life is
actively remembered and valued into a remedial schema can shape how community
reparation in the wake of state-sanctioned violence is conceptualized. “The realization
of these desires can transform a world when these visions are based in traditions that
see place as the location of co-operation, stewardship, and social justice rather than
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sites just to be dominated, enclosed, commodified, exploited, and segregated. Black
Geographies will play a central role in the reconstruction of the global community”
(McKittrick and Woods 2007, 6). In Anniston’s case, environmental remediation could
value the sense of place that West Anniston residents express through memory-work,
leading potentially to a very different outcome for the future of the city as it is
reconstructed.
This paper contributes to the literatures on memory and Environmental Justice
in two ways. After a brief discussion of methods, “Remediation and Forgetting in
Anniston,” gives an example of how state environmental remediation encourages
encourages the erasure and forgetting of qualitative concerns about the cleanup in
Anniston in favor of a cleanup process that operates according to EPA-defined
conventions. It demonstrates the limitations EPA imposes on what the cleanup is
designed to accomplish. In the following section, Reconstructing the Invisible Through
Memory, Black Geographies are analyzed in both memorial projects in the city and
participation in the remedial process through informal “memory work.” This analysis
highlights the disconnect between the process of PCB remediation in the city and the
way residents use memory to articulate alternative visions of Anniston’s sense of place
and the potential for remediation.
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Methods
This research is based on fieldwork conducted in Anniston from August 2013January 2016. The author attended CAG meetings about the cleanup of PCBs in
Anniston. CAGs are commonly used by the EPA to inform impacted communities
about the progress of remediation processes. They are composed of a volunteer group
of community members who review and comment on cleanup procedures and
progress, and they are tasked with helping solicit community attendance and
participation in semi-monthly meetings where the EPA and corporate actors executing
the cleanup give updates. These meetings were an important venue for learning about
the ongoing concerns people in Anniston had and continue to have about the cleanup
and the long-term impacts of the pollution in the city. They were also helpful for
understanding the often tense relationships between community members and the
scientific and legal experts who were planning and executing the cleanup.
In addition, the author conducted archival research of local publications such as
the Anniston Star newspaper, documentation from the EPA describing and governing
the cleanup, and documentation kept by local organizations regarding the history of
Anniston and the cleanup process. This archival work was both a necessity for
understanding the context of the discussions happening in CAG meetings, as well as
for building a deeper understanding the complex institutional arrangements and
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decisions that everyday people must navigate in the wake of an environmental disaster
like Anniston’s.
The cleanup documentation includes evidence of how residents’ and
remediators’ perspectives on priorities for the cleanup differed. One of the most used
documents in this study is a public comment period held by the EPA. There are
thousands of pages of documentation about the cleanup of PCBs in Anniston, and
most of this is scientific documentation of every step of the cleanup. Public comment
periods lend understanding to the way the EPA views its responsibilities to public
concerns about the remediation and are sources for understanding what those
concerns are throughout the cleanup process. Public comment periods work like this:
the EPA publishes a document outlining a plan, the public has an opportunity to
comment, and the EPA issues responses to the comments. The comment periods in
Anniston were a widely used opportunity to participate in the discussion about
remediation. A wide range of participants, including community groups, law firms,
individuals, and corporate entities, are represented.
Additional sources, such as the Anniston Star newspaper, help piece together
the way residents have used memory throughout the remediation to express both a
sense of pain about the changes wrought in the city, but also to articulate a vision for
what could be restored. While aspects of the pollution and remediation have left large
120

swaths of city in disrepair, there is an underlying geography of black life in this
landscape that is not valued explicitly by the remediation. This is important because
Anniston’s geography is more than a horrible incident of racialized environmental
violence; it is more than a poisoned landscape. It is also a home, and for many, a place
with struggling for and defending. Residents’ memories are a way to “recount the
archive differently” (McKittrick 2014) and tell Anniston’s story from a vantage point that
values the life that was and remains there.

Remediation and Forgetting in Anniston
The EPA held a public comment period in response to “Section 122
Administrative Agreement and Order on Consent for Removal Action,” the results of
which were published on January 17, 2006. This agreement clarified the responsibilities
for the cleanup of lead and PCBs in the Anniston area. While PCBs clearly had one
major polluter, The Monsanto Company, responsibility for the cleanup of widespread
lead pollution that was discovered during the PCB cleanup had to be divvied among
several additional parties. According to the EPA, most of the lead pollution came from
foundry sand that was used as filler dirt in residential properties.
The ways in which the EPA responds or does not respond to certain types of
criticism is significant. For example, in the following comment, residents question which
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properties are being focused upon for the cleanup, with particular concern about
where children play:
Comment: The area covered by the Agreement is too small; Agreement should
require cleanup of commercial properties. How many properties must be
sampled? Are all lots that are undeveloped excluded from the definition of
Residential Properties or only those not zoned residential? The definition of
Residential Properties should include vacant lots since they could be developed
in the future and children sometimes play on them.

These comments were submitted in various forms by several parties, including a
law firm, a church, individuals, community groups, and a petition signed by 237
people.
EPA’s response explains the logic guiding the cleanup, stating that over 2,000
residential properties have been sampled. It does not directly address the concern
about where children play. Rather, they attempt to assuage concern:
…Only “Undeveloped Vacant Lots” are excluded from the definition of
“Residential Properties.” These are intended to be properties that, although
zoned residential, have no indication that they have ever been subject to
development or re-grading. As such, they are unlikely to have had Foundry Sand
placed on them and there is little risk of lead exposure from Respondents’ past
activities.
The inattention to concern about children’s play is significant because the issue of
where children play continued to be raised frequently in CAG meetings I attended
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years after this comment period in Anniston. In spite of the city’s toxic history, there are
no signs that indicate where pollutants may be or have been in the city, even though
attendees at CAG meetings have requested them. EPA officials have given two
responses to such requests: one, it is up to the city to place such signs. Two, EPA has
conducted a thorough cleanup and no one is in danger.
An example of this second type of response is also evident in the comment
period. When comments requested continued oversight, the EPA plainly cited a
handbook:
Comment: The agreement should provide for long term monitoring and
institutional controls, including procedures for enforcing the controls.
This comment was submitted by several parties, including three community
groups.
Response: After completion of the cleanup called for in the Agreement, all
residential soils addressed by the Agreement will contain less than 400ppm in
the top 2 feet of soil. Consistent with EPA Region 4’s practices and EPA’s
Superfund Lead Contaminated Residential Sites Handbook, OSWER 9285.7-50,
EPA believes this provides adequate protection without the need to implement
additional institutional controls.
Another very brief exchange is almost comical:
Comment: The people of Anniston should be treated fairly and with respect.
This comment was submitted by seven individuals.
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Response: EPA agrees with this comment and will continue to treat the residents
of Anniston fairly and with respect.
Rather than respond with concern for where children play, or whether the
neighborhood has access to continued monitoring, the EPA’s response is consistent:
thank you for participating, we are currently doing everything correctly. This shows a
limitation to the EPA’s willingness or ability to engage with public concerns that do not
fully align with its mandates; based on obervations of CAG meetings, this unwillingness
can read as a willful lack of concern for community input.
This lack of concern (perceived or real) contributes to an erasure of residents’
concerns because residents are expected to forgive and forget long-term, wellfounded feelings of mistrust toward state agencies for the sake of the expediency of
the cleanup. Concerns like those above about technical aspects of the cleanup are
regularly dismissed under the banner of scientific and regulatory authority, both in this
document and in CAG meetings. When the EPA says, trust us, the community is being
asked to forget that some community-driven concerns are not being attended to, all
while the city continues to suffer. This is reminiscent of Hanchard’s use of Nietzsche to
explain forgetting: “…forgetting is necessary in order for people to live beyond the
burdens and impasses of past traumas” (2008, 50). In remediation, it serves the state
and the process well to encourage people to forget.
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This forgetting, however, does not serve the people of Anniston equally. In
addition to The Monsanto Company, state authorities also hold responsibility for
allowing the city to become polluted. The following exchange regards an agency
called the Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM), which
repeatedly allowed The Monsanto Company to continue dumping PCBs in Anniston,
and they did almost nothing to tell the public about the pollution after testing revealed
its persistence throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Shelby 2002).
Comment: Explain what oversight issues are charged to ADEM. Why is ADEM
given any oversight authority when the community does not trust them?
This comment was submitted by several parties, including two individuals, and
two community groups.
Response: EPA strives to create and promote strong partnerships with its State
counterparts. Although EPA and ADEM have not yet finalized any specific
division of labor for oversight responsibilities of the work required under the
Agreement, EPA believes ADEM’s involvement will provide valuable assistance
to EPA and the Anniston community. EPA anticipates that in addition to
reviewing and providing comments on work plans and reports, ADEM will assist
EPA by directly providing on-site field oversight of Respondents’ sampling and
cleanup activities under the agreement.
In its response, EPA says nothing to acknowledge the statement that the community
does not trust ADEM. It only says that ADEM will be highly involved in this process,
and they are actively investigating how ADEM could be more involved as per usual in
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EPA policy. While the EPA, and the remediation, may very well benefit from a
partnership with ADEM, by not acknowledging the issues residents have with the
agency, people are being asked to forget and put aside a long history of
environmental neglect and this agency’s role in it.
These exchanges demonstrate the human limitations in the remediation. The
process is only designed to achieve a prescribed physical condition – 400 ppm of lead
in the top two feet of soil, for example. Remediation is a very impactful and invasive
experience for a residential community to undergo. Federal authorities come onto
private land and determine, with very little choice or input from the people living there
whether or not a dwelling and its surrounding area is safe. This could decide whether
your property remains valuable, whether your neighborhood is desirable, whether you
are even able to keep your home, or able to reasonably maintain the belief that you
will be safe from illness.
Therefore, the EPA’s lack of response to the qualitative concerns residents raise
in the comment period and in meetings about the nature of the cleanup acts to erase
those concerns and, in the ADEM example, attempt to forget key details of how the
pollution came to be in Anniston in the first place, such as state neglect for black life. In
the following section, however, it is clear that residents do not allow those details to be
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so easily forgotten. The open question is if, and how, such memories could become
valued by remedial processes.

Reconstructing the Invisible Through Memory
On October 20, 1996, an Anniston Star headline reported: “Last Days for a
Neighborhood,” describing Eloise Mealing’s decision to sell her home to Monsanto
and move away from her neighborhood, Sweet Valley-Cobbtown. Her daughter,
Cassandra Roberts, received land in the same neighborhood from her father when she
got married, and had just sold it to The Monsanto Company. “My daddy wanted me to
have that land….I had a real hard time signing those papers. It was so emotional I
could hardly take it” (Pezzullo 1996). The article describes Mrs. Mealing’s beauty salon,
her friendly connections to neighbors, and the farming practiced in the neighborhood
before pollution was discovered that changed their lives, and changed the city of
Anniston, Alabama for years to come.
Just before these events, it became public that The Monsanto Company had
knowingly polluted large swaths of the city. Sweet Valley-Cobbtown in West Anniston
was the neighborhood closest to the factory and was the first area in the city to
experience any kind of cleanup. This initial cleanup deal, struck between ADEM and
Monsanto in March 1996, stipulated that Monsanto had 21 days to offer relocation to
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residents, and 60 days to identify all PCB contaminated areas. By October 1996, Eloise
Mealing and her neighbors were the last to leave. In 6 months’ time, a neighborhood
built over the course of decades – complete with memories, and a sense of community
- was physically erased.

Figure 6 The old car wash in Sweet Valley – Cobbtown. Photo by author.

Now the entire area lies vacant (see Figure 6) as an open wound to remaining
residents, with no marker of what once existed. Aside from an abandoned car wash,
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there is little evidence there today to suggest what had been there. Now the entire
area is bordered by a chain link fence. In a couple of places, roads turn into the area
and eerily stop where the fence starts.
As noted in the opening quote to this paper, McKittrick argues such “invisible
geographies” are home to a story of struggle that deserves to be told; this struggle is
important, but has been a neglected facet of Anniston’s geography throughout the
PCB cleanup. As properties lay to waste or are destroyed, so go too many of the
physical manifestations of the memories that people so frequently describe, not
uncommon in areas with histories of black life and struggle (Nieves 2007). Sweet
Valley-Cobbtown is not the only place in the city where these “invisible geographies”
exist, but it is the most concentrated site of physical destruction. Other parts of the
West Anniston neighborhood, such as the West 15th street district, once known for
local businesses, seem relatively more active, but, largely, play unfortunate host to
vacant lots, abandoned homes, and closed-up businesses.
However, there are several ways in which residents have sought to recover a
sense of place in West Anniston. One is through the struggle to have a greater
recognition of values and interests beyond physical remediation through residents’
participation in the formal cleanup process. This is why the CAG meetings were often
contentious. As mentioned in the introduction, the cleanup is referred to as a “Band129

Aid solution” by community members in attendance at CAG meetings, an
impermanent solution to the city’s, and West Anniston’s, long term problems. While
the cleanup may meet benchmarks for soil, water, and air quality – all of which still
come up for debate in these meetings – it has not repaired the ruptured the pace and
quality of life in West Anniston since the extent of the pollution was discovered.
One CAG member frequently emphasized the need for Anniston to “be whole”
again, signaling what needed to be replaced could not be found in scientific
remediation. This resonated frequently with what I heard in the time for community
feedback at the meetings. Attendees would talk about specific properties that
remained in disrepair, express anxieties about the air quality or soil quality due to
properties that had not been cleaned up, relate fear over safety in schools and
churches frequented by many people from all over the city – parts remediated and not.
Field notes include observations of corporate and remedial officials getting into
arguments with community members about the manner of the cleanup process,
expressions of frustration over ongoing unaddressed health issues, and, most relevant
to this paper, expressions of pain and frustration about Anniston today compared to
what it once was. These discussions in particular are “memory work” (Houston 2012,
Till 2012). While they take place outside of a conventional memorialization context,
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memory and connection to place emerge as important factors that remain overlooked
in the remedial process.
In meetings, residents would frequently recall a different time for the city, when
West Anniston was a much better place to live: when there were thriving black-owned
businesses, when the population was higher, and neighborhoods felt more like
communities. Many of the worries about West Anniston’s present state – crime,
poverty, threats to close schools in the area, a lack of development – were tied by
residents to a disconnect between the idea of what Anniston once was and what the
remediation process was actually designed to accomplish.
While the settlement agreement did include provisions for an education fund
and a health clinic, pollution has left a scar on the landscape that people have difficulty
ignoring- in part because the pollution interfered with a sense of neighborhood-scale
self-reliance in West Anniston. In meetings, people described the practice of
subsistence fishing and agriculture before the pollution, and a landscape of gardens
and fruit trees—but the PCB pollution made that impossible to continue. David Baker,
a leader in the fight against PCBs, stated in a Senate hearing in 2002:
“…we have had to take off our shoes when we got ready to go into the house.
Our children cannot play on the grass, so they play in the streets. Our children
should wash their balls if they are playing outside, wash the dogs if they wanted
to play with their own pets in their yard. We cannot plant a garden in our yard
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anymore. Many of the times we have been told, ‘Well, you can plant the garden,
but you have to be careful how you plant it.’ We have people planting collard
greens in five-gallon buckets just to enjoy the land that they live on.”
Outside of the remediation process, residents have left a record of this ignored sense
of place formally in a public mural project and informally in the archives of local
historical newspapers. These sources are additional sites to understand West
Anniston’s sense of place; the mural inserts an alternative narrative directly into the site
of erasure caused by environmental injustice. The newspaper articles are an
undervalued record of life in the city that reflects many of the testimonies about that
life that have been expressed in CAG meetings.
West 15th Street in Anniston holds a legendary status among many in the community,
particularly among older generations of people who have memories growing up in the
area. It runs perpendicular to the main thoroughfares of the historically white side of
the city – Quintard Avenue and Noble Street. Today, driving West on 15th street from
Anniston’s downtown, one is greeted to the neighborhood with a mural titled, “A City
Within a City.”
Designed by a black artist named John Davis, and assisted by white artist
Joseph Giri, who completed the mural after Davis’ untimely death just before the
mural’s completion (Hayes 2016), the piece covers the entire side of a building. In an
online interview Giri stated that he and Davis, along with the Spirit of Anniston
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Figure 7 A City Within a City. Photo by author.
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Foundation, a nonprofit organization that also created a Civil Rights trail in the
city, solicited input from the West Anniston community for the contents of the mural.
From left to right, he describes women singing in a church choir, and children roller
skating on West 15th and Pine street, in front of “some buildings that are now gone.”
A worker, said to be local West Anniston artist John Davis, stands in front of pipe
factories, an industry that Anniston was once known for but “has gone by the wayside.”
Next, Cobb Avenue High School (which no longer exists) and its mascot, the Black
Panthers, a World War II soldier, and a church, said to be a Presbyterian church that has
since been torn down and replaced (West Anniston Mural, Anniston, Alabama 2014).
This mural functions as a memorial counter-narrative to what is readily observable in
West Anniston: a neighborhood suffering from poverty and abandonment. It
reimagines what the space of West Anniston was and could be as it stands in contrast
to the readily observable “material ‘lack’” in the neighborhood (McKittrick and Woods
2007, 7). The presence and themes of the mural give visibility to a black sense of place
that is rooted in a sense of community and particular sites of pride. While Giri tends to
point out what has gone away – the buildings, the pipe factory – the mural demands a
recognition of a different perspective on the value of this neighborhood, that “there
are always many ways of producing and perceiving space” (McKittrick and Woods
2007, 7).
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The mural also connects to the concerns that people expressed in the
remediation process; for example, the children in the mural could be the same children
someone wrote about in their comment to the EPA. While the landscape of West
Anniston may be an open wound, the mural provides a powerful visual alternative in a
small town landscape. In this sense, the mural is a story: “…people are making
decisions all the time about the kinds of worlds they want to live in and they are
imaginatively and practically striving towards them. Stories about Environmental Justice
can carry these diverse ideas along together to produce different environmental
imaginaries…in and of a damaged world” (Houston 2012, 433). While the mural may
not be directly about Anniston’s struggle for Environmental Justice, its positive
presence and placement directly in a landscape so marked by environmental
devastation acts as an “Angel of Alternate History,” (Solnit, as used in Houston 2012).
Houston explains, “Solnit’s angel asks us to believe in the invisible and the
unimaginable because it is here that alternative knowledge is sustained and where
different futures might be enacted” (Houston 2012, 419). In other words, the mural is a
reminder and an encouragement to imagine something different for this place.
Building on reconstructing a black sense place in the city, the Anniston Star
newspaper, as a relatively progressive newspaper in the region, did include some
limited sections dedicated to the mundane aspects of everyday black life in the city (as
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opposed to nothing at all). For example, in 1901, the paper describes a celebration of
Emancipation Day: “A feature of the parade, which was an unusually long one, was a
trade display in which a dozen floats represented as many negro business housed in
the city, drug stores, grocery stores, bicycle repair shops, restaurants, benevolent
insurance societies, herb doctors and general stores, all being represented” (The
Anniston Star 1901). Much of the coverage in subsequent years accompanies this
business theme, and several articles mention the formation of a chapter of the Negro
Business and Professional Men’s Club. This club, which first started meeting in Anniston
in 1943, was part of a nationwide network of such organizations which were started by
Booker T. Washington. Washington’s approach to achieving black equality- a focus on
education, entrepreneurship, and an acceptance of incrementalism and
assimilationism, was and remains controversial, particularly among more radically
minded-thinkers such as W.E.B Dubois. However, Anniston residents’ participation –
along with neighboring Hobson City, which was an all-black municipality nearby – gives
perspective on the pervasiveness of Washington’s ideas and the impacts of his
organizing, something that has been largely under-explored due in no small part to
Dubois’ critique (Boston 2010).
Not only does this archival evidence provide a paper trail for residents’ claims of
a thriving black business district earlier in Anniston’s history, it helps bring that memory
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to life in a more animated way. Given Anniston’s currently wounded landscape, the
Emancipation Day Parade, and the streets lined with businesses once again open up an
alternate history for the city. Anniston was not just a place where the KKK bombed
Freedom Riders, it was not just a place where pollution ruined lives. If stories produce a
new world (Houston 2012, 422), archives help recreate a once-valued, now-forgotten
world. These moments in time and space add up to a “sense of place” that has been
badly damaged by environmental violence. What if remediation could restore the
communities one can read about here? If these qualitative aspects of place could also
be valued –whether looking back through history, paying attention to art, or simply
listening to what people say in public meetings—the project of remediation might
synthesize attention to both human and environmental needs.

Conclusion
The Monsanto Company was responsible for some of the most dramatic and
deadly destruction in Anniston – a massive pollution event, poisoning the air, water,
and soil, contaminating the bloodstreams of thousands of people, setting the stage for
massive divestment from West Anniston and the City of Anniston as a whole. The scale
of The Monsanto Company’s destruction calls for something much deeper and more
transformative than a lead or PCB soil content quota. It calls for a serious, deep
reckoning, with the toll that pollution takes on human life and human connections to
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place. Without this, remediation plays its own quiet role in the ongoing devaluation of
black life because it fails to even nominally recognize pleas to restore the qualitative
characteristics that make places worth living in.
In between the memory of West Anniston and the present day landscape, there
is a story to be told – one about urban blight, and deindustrialization, and pollution,
but also one about a vibrant community that residents value. This was a community
built in segregated, white supremacist Alabama, a place people – and public art –
describe as “A City Within a City.” Through the lens of memory, state-driven
remediation emerges as a tool in the ongoing strategic erasure of black life from the
state’s project to move on from Anniston’s legacy of pollution. What appears to be a
benign extension of environmentalist goodwill unto West Anniston instead functions as
another violent encounter from the state. Remediation becomes a tool to facilitate the
violence of state-sponsored forgetting.
In remedial projects, particularly in cases of environmental racism, there is a
need to innovate methods to not only remediate the soil, but remediate that sense of
place that has been lost over time, and to take seriously the rupture created by
absence. To remediate means to repair, to make right, to restore. In any case of
environmental injustice, pollution isn’t a discrete issue- its presence is embedded in a
context that allowed it to be there, that allowed the slow painful death of friends,
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family, neighbors, and place. People engaged in remediation projects should be
challenged to think beyond the current structures of environmental remediation and
pay closer attention to grassroots demands for justice over the long term. Scholars
must pay closer attention to what communities value in life- not just what has been lost
through death.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
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Anniston, Alabama is home to a particularly egregious and sad case of
environmental injustice. While operating an industrial chemical factory in the city,
Monsanto dumped tons of Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) in the town’s soil, water,
and air. The pollution impacted an area encompassing dozens of miles of waterways,
but most acutely impacted the majority-black neighborhood in the shadow of the
factory. The active pollution began roughly in 1933 and continued until Monsanto
halted the manufacture of PCBs in Anniston 1971. Latent pollution from runoff and
other means continued for much longer.
For many decades, the pollution went unaddressed, until, in 1993, fish
contaminated with extremely high levels of PCBs were found downstream from the
factory in Choccolocco Creek. Residents living in the polluted area sued Monsanto,
and soon the toxic knowledge of PCBs spread back upstream to the source. Before
residents living close to the factory organized, Monsanto started a buyout program for
residents in the Sweet Valley-Cobbtown neighborhood. While Monsanto described its
relocation offers as “generous,” some residents found that the offers were not enough
to be able to relocate. Others refused to relocate, in spite of the pollution, because of
the value placed on a sense of community.
Over time, residents began organizing environmental groups to advocate for
themselves and for a strong cleanup and remuneration process. While these groups
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organized community meetings, protests, and garnered significant news coverage, one
of their primary activities was to organize and participate in litigation against Monsanto.
This dissertation research began in 2013, some ten years after a settlement
agreement was reached in Anniston. However, observations of informational
community meetings about the progress of the cleanup found a great deal of tension
still animated the cleanup process, undergirded especially by distrust of corporate
actors and the EPA by community members.
Why was such tension still so palpable, so many years after a formal legal
agreement, and so far into the remediation process? Is this what Environmental Justice
looks like? This dissertation uses three vignettes through which to understand the
problem of ongoing tension in Anniston and the implications for understanding the
current state of affairs in Environmental Justice more broadly.
First, in the chapter titled “Understanding Corporate Scalar Transformations and
the Production of Environmental Inequalities in Anniston, Alabama,” a discourse
analysis of archival documentation of changes in Monsanto’s corporate identity over
time reveals a strategic use of scale to produce uneven power relations between
corporate actors and ordinary people.
Second, the chapter titled, “Anniston’s Neoliberal Environmental Justice Policy
in Practice,” critiques the justice system’s notions of Environmental Justice as they
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played out in the Anniston case. First, the state effectively privatized the responsibility
for the cleanup by agreeing to a Superfund Alternative agreement, where the
corporate actors responsible for the pollution played a controversial hands-on role in
the construction and implementation of cleanup plans. Second,
the settlements themselves were distributed unevenly and based on an individualized,
quantitative logic of injury, rather than responding in a centralized way to a collective
problem. This raises concerns about the logic guiding current Environmental Justice
legal policy and its inability to align the demands of impacted communities with longterm results.
The third analysis chapter titled, “Remediating a Sense of Place: Memory and
Environmental Justice in Anniston, Alabama,” examines how the remediation process
in Anniston facilitates the violence of forgetting the life and sense of place that
animated the West Anniston community. While the remediation focuses on cleaning
the soil, water, and air, in its wake is a scarred neighborhood marked by abandonment.
The remediation’s failure to reconcile the memory of West Anniston’s rich history with
the present state of the neighborhood is one more injustice in a long history of
violence toward black life in the city. Memory-work surrounding the cleanup process is
an important, neglected source for understanding the sense of place that residents
hope to see restored.
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The major conclusions of this research are:
•

Corporations produce scaled identities to advantageously empower themselves
and weather shifts in their profitability, while ordinary people are limited in their
capacity to respond in kind to such unequal power arrangements.

•

Current legal solutions for Environmental Justice are not meeting the demands
expressed by Environmental Justice movement actors, and in themselves
demonstrate a resistance to solutions that would more fairly address a collective
body of victims due to the normative economizing of neoliberalism.

•

The process of remediation is confined to limiting risks from the physical
environment, even while the city itself continues to struggle. This can cause a
source of pain and frustration for residents who remain in impacted areas, who
wish to see a more holistic solution to resolving environmental injustice,
including remediating a sense of place.
This research contributes to a growing conversation about the current state of

affairs for Environmental Justice scholarship and activism. Laura Pulido (2016) and
David N. Pellow (2005), two leading voices in the field, have both called for a radical
re-examination of Environmental Justice strategies and practice after looking
retrospectively at the project so far. This case study fulfills their calls for critical
interpretations of Environmental Justice engagements and policies.
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In addition, this scholarship brings together three sub-fields in geography that
rarely converse with one another: legal geography, political economy, and memory. By
centering this study so firmly in place, and by engaging in the field for an extended
span of time, it became possible to see these unexpected linkages more clearly.
Therefore, in addition to contributing through connecting these sub-fields, this
research stands in advocacy for extended temporal engagements with research
communities. It would not have been possible to draw these conclusions over the
course of a summer research cycle; it took years of extended observation and time in
the archives to draw these lines, however crooked they may be at times. This project is
in line with research that tries to span the divide between nature and humankind; we
cannot have one without the other.
There are several areas ripe for future research. First, more analyses should be
done of the geographies embedded in corporations’ strategies to gain an
advantageous power footing in environmental conflicts. This research could directly
inform movement actors and their allies as they seek future Environmental Justice
victories.
Second, more investigation is needed regarding Environmental Justice conflict
resolution over the long term. The Anniston case is particularly bleak; are there
counter-examples of great successes? Or, more likely, are there more disappointing
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stories from which cautionary tales should be learned? Simply put, not enough is
known about how these scenarios play out over the longue term.
In addition, there is almost nothing in the literature that discusses the Superfund
Alternative program at all, in spite of its widespread use in the southeastern and midwestern states. Why are these regions so concentrated with this method?
Finally, memory and environment is an important, emerging field. How are
environmental conflicts, solutions, and futures shaped by memory? What role could
memory play in innovating solutions for Environmental Justice problems? The
connections between the pain of environmental injuries and memory are
underexplored.
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